





THE EU’S ENERGY SUPPLY SECURITY: OPTIONS FOR GAS SUPPLY 













Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 


























©Eray Erbil 2018 
























THE EU’S ENERGY SUPPLY SECURITY: OPTIONS FOR GAS SUPPLY 
DIVERSIFICATION AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY 
 
Eray Erbil 
M.A. Thesis, June 2018 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Senem Aydın Düzgit 
Key Words: Energy Security, Import Dependency, the European Union, Southeast 
Europe, Turkey, Diversification 
 
With the gas disruptions to the European Union in 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises, the 
Community decided to diversify its supply sources and routes, develop energy 
infrastructure between the member states and increase energy efficiency to strengthen 
energy security of the Union. The thesis will examine the possibility of nine countries as 
being an alternative to Russian gas, and it will analyze Turkey's role in transmitting gas 
from the Caspian, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean regions to Europe. Besides, the 
energy security of Southeast European countries will be briefly mentioned since it is 
important for the energy security of the Community. 
The thesis argues that besides Azeri gas which will be supplied to Europe in the short-
run, Iraq has a potential to supply gas to Europe via pipelines in the medium to long-run. 
Moreover, Israel, Egypt, and Iran are potential LNG suppliers to the EU in the medium 
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Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Senem Aydın Düzgit 
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Avrupa Birliği'ne 2006 ve 2009 Ukrayna krizlerinde yaşanan gaz kesintileri nedeniyle 
Topluluk, tedarik kaynaklarını ve rotalarını çeşitlendirmeye, üye devletler arasında enerji 
altyapısı geliştirmeye ve Birliğin enerji güvenliğini güçlendirmek için enerji verimliliğini 
artırmaya karar verdi. Tez, dokuz ülkenin Rusya gazına alternatif olma olasılığını 
inceleyecek ve Türkiye'nin Hazar, Ortadoğu ve Akdeniz bölgelerinden Avrupa’ ya gaz 
iletmesindeki rolünü analiz edecektir. Ayrıca, Güneydoğu Avrupa ülkelerinin enerji 
güvenliği, topluluğun enerji güvenliği açısından önemli olduğu için kısaca değinilecektir. 
Tez, kısa vadede Avrupa'ya iletilecek olan Azeri gazının yanı sıra, Irak'ın orta ve uzun 
vadede boru hatları üzerinden Avrupa'ya gaz tedarik etme potansiyeline sahip olduğunu 
savunuyor. Dahası, İsrail, Mısır ve İran, orta ve uzun vadede AB'ye potansiyel LNG 
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In the globalized world, energy is one of the crucial sources for countries. It affects social 
and economic activities. It affects social activities because people need energy in their 
households for heating, cooking and other purposes. It affects economic activities because 
industries need energy for production. Consequently, the life without energy is 
unthinkable. In the case of Europe, energy takes an important place since Europe is not 
an energy-rich continent. As a source of energy, fossil fuels have the highest share in the 
energy composition of the European Union (EU).1 Among these fossil fuels, the thesis 
will focus on the issue pertaining to the trade and usage of natural gas. 
Given the fact that the European Union production of natural gas has been decreasing, 
energy security has become one of the important pillars of the energy policy of the 
Community. The importance of the energy security of the Union increased especially 
after the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises. With these two crises, European countries 
remained without gas even though they were not part of the conflict. This led the Union 
to reconsider its overdependence on supplies coming from Russia. After these crises, the 
EU decided to take measures to increase its energy security. These measures include 
increasing energy efficiency, developing energy infrastructures between the member 
states, diversification of sources and diversification of supply routes. 
In reaction to these developments, Russia reformulated its energy strategy towards the 
Union. However, developments in LNG and shale gas, as well as the Union’s 
diversification efforts, have compelled Russia to lower its gas prices to the European 
countries. The main reason for the reduction of gas prices is that Russia wants to protect 
its market share in the EU and it wants to ensure revenues coming from the sales of 
energy. In fact, Russian gas prices are indexed to oil prices. Consequently, Russian gas 
prices decreased as oil prices decreased. Therefore, the country has been able to protect 
                                                          
1 “World Energy Balances.” International Energy Agency. 2017: 626-640 
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its dominant market share in the EU. The Russian dominance is more apparent especially 
in Southeast European countries since these countries are highly dependent on imports of 
Russian gas.    
In this respect, the main of the thesis is to investigate the ways of how the Union can 
consolidate energy security. As a result, this thesis investigates new opportunities for the 
European countries for decreasing their dependency on Russian gas and enhancing their 
energy security.  
Furthermore, the thesis also aims to elaborate the role of Turkey in the EU’s 
diversification efforts and decreasing the dependencies of Southeast European countries 
on Russian gas. In the current situation, Azeri gas will be supplied to Italy via TAP. 10 
billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas is not a significant volume for Western European 
countries but it is the significant volume for Southeast European countries. The gas 
dependency of Southeast European countries is not the main subject of the thesis, but it 
is one of the topics that on the agenda of the European Union, since it directly affects the 
energy security of the Union. Therefore, the issue will be mentioned briefly. 
Five Southeast European countries, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
are highly dependent on Russian gas, and they do not consume significant volumes of 
gas. These countries imported 21,1 bcm and consumed 22,6 bcm of gas in 2016 in which 
Russia supplied a total of 15,8 bcm to these five countries.2 This means that Russian share 
in these five countries’ gas imports and consumption were more than 70%. Two Southeast 
European countries, Romania and Croatia, had domestic gas production, so they were not 
dependent on Russian gas. Azeri gas can decrease Southeast European countries’ import 
dependency on Russian gas significantly. The prospects of Azerbaijan to divert its gas to 
Southeast Europe is possible only if the country produces and supplies more gas to 
TANAP by developing its gas fields in the future. 
All in all, in the short-run, Azerbaijan will supply its gas to Europe, so that energy security 
of the Union will be consolidated. Besides, in the medium to long-run, Iraq has a potential 
to supply gas to Southern Gas Corridor of Europe, but the prospects of Iraq to supply its 
gas to Turkey and then to Europe depends on the settlement of the disputes between KRG 
and the Iraqi government. Moreover, Israel, Egypt, and Iran are likely to provide gas as 
                                                          




LNG to Europe. Consequently, gas competition in the European market will escalate 
which is vital for the energy security of the Union. 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, the objectives and legal basis 
of the energy policy of the European Union will be explained. Then, the chapter will 
provide an overview of the energy structure of the Community which includes 
production, consumption, and imports. After, current and planned natural gas pipelines 
will be explained. Moreover, the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises will be elaborated, and 
its effects on the Union will be analyzed. 
After the two Ukrainian crises, the Community decided to strengthen its energy security 
by diversifying Russian gas. Therefore, the second chapter will provide an analysis of 
nine countries to whether they can be an alternative to Russian gas through pipelines. 
Three countries from Caspian Region (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran), three countries 
from North Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Libya) and three countries from the Middle-East& 
Mediterranean Region (Iraq, Israel, Republic of Cyprus) will be analyzed.  
In securing energy supplies of the EU, Turkey will have a crucial role. For this reason, in 
the third chapter, Turkey’s energy structure, energy policy, pipelines that pass from 
through its territory and planned pipeline projects will be explained. Furthermore, Turkey 
has a desire to evolve into a physical energy hub in its region. Therefore, the chapter will 
analyze the possibility of Turkey to become an energy hub in the Eurasian nexus. 
The last chapter will focus on diversification efforts of the Union. At first, possible 
contributions of LNG, shale gas, and renewable energy to the energy security of the EU 
will be discussed. Then, how the interdependence between the EU and Russia affects the 
energy trade will be described. Russia both aims to bypass Ukraine and to protect its 
market share in the EU. In this respect, Russia has developed Turkish Stream and North 
Stream 2 pipelines. However, at this point, it is argued in this chapter that Azeri gas and 
LNG will increase competition among the gas suppliers. In the future, new gas players 
such as Iraq via pipeline, Iran, Egypt and Israel via LNG will join the competition in the 
European market, so that European countries will have alternative suppliers. 
The methodology of the thesis is secondary data analysis. This means that I collected and 
analyzed reports, statistics, journals, website articles, books and many other sources to 
support and justify my arguments. In the thesis, I place the World Energy Outlook and 
World Energy Balances published by International Energy Agency (IEA) as a primary 
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source. Moreover, I provide statistics from Eurostat, The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, BP, and ENI. Furthermore, I explained many concepts by using energy 
sections of the European Commission and the European Parliament. Besides, I used 
articles from popular newspaper websites such as BBC, Euractiv, Azernews, Hurriyet 













































Energy constitutes one of the most important policy areas for the Union. Energy, which 
is needed to power a modern industrial society, is used in power generation, industry, 
transportation and in other areas. Europe does not have significant indigenous fossil fuel 
resources, so their production level is low. Rather than producing, the European Union 
(EU) imports its energy. Even though the EU imports crude oil, natural gas, and coal from 
other countries, the thesis will focus on natural gas, whereas oil and coal are fungible 
commodities available in the international markets, natural gas is still primarily 
transported through pipelines and thus regionally traded according to long-term gas 
contracts. 
From 1998 to 2009, the EU adopted three energy packages which are about the 
liberalization of the electricity and gas markets. In 2007, the 2020 Strategy was formed. 
In 2011, 2050 Strategy was adopted, and in 2014, 2030 Strategy was set. These strategies 
are essential for the transition to a low carbon economy, increasing energy efficiency, and 
securing the energy supply of the Union. In 2014, the EU established Energy Security 
Strategy and finally in 2015, the Energy Union was founded. All these shows that the 
Community made progress to strengthen its energy framework. Especially after the 2006 
and 2009 Ukrainian crises, the developments accelerated. With the two crises, gas flows 
reduced to Europe, and the European countries remained without gas. Besides, these two 
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crises demonstrated that gas supplies could be disrupted. For this reason, the EU, on the 
one hand, accelerated its progress of developments and on the other hand, it started to 
look for alternative suppliers.  
In the first part, the energy policy of the EU will be explained. This part includes the 
objectives and legal basis of the energy policy. Then, reforms in the field of energy from 
the 1990s to 2015 will be described. In the second part, the energy structure of the EU 
will be demonstrated. This will include production, consumption, and imports of the 
Community. After, current and planned pipelines will be described. The EU has currently 
14 pipelines that import natural gas from different countries. There are four pipelines 
from North-Eastern corridor, five pipelines from North-Western corridor, four pipelines 
from South-Western corridor and one interconnector from South-Eastern corridor.  
To meet with the gas demand, new pipelines will be online in Europe in the short to 
medium terms. In North-Eastern Corridor, Russia decided to build Nord Stream 2 to 
bypass Ukraine and to supply gas directly to the European market. In South-Eastern 
Corridor, four pipelines were decided to be constructed by the Union to bring gas from 
the Caspian and the Mediterranean regions. Russia responded to these attempts of the 
European Union by initiating the construction of Turkish Stream in the same corridor to 
protect its domination in the European market. Besides, one pipeline is decided to be built 
by the EU in South-Western corridor to bring gas from North Africa. All these 
demonstrate that the Community concentrates on its South-Eastern corridor to diversify 
Russian gas. In the last part, 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises will be elaborated, and its 








Energy has a prominent place in the European politics. The member states use different 
energy sources for their energy supply. Among them, the most important energy products 
that EU imports are natural gas and crude oil. As the dependency for the energy of 
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member states varies, it is hard to agree on common energy policy. For energy security 
and sustainability, the EU has worked on creating a common energy policy for many 
years. The EU energy policy was first included into the EU framework with Lisbon 
Treaty. Title XXI- Article 194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) explains the general objectives of the energy policy. According to the Treaty, the 
primary objectives of the EU energy policy is: “To ensure the functioning of the energy 
market, to ensure the security of energy supply in the Union, to promote energy efficiency 
and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy and to 
promote the interconnection of energy networks.”3 
Additionally, Article 194(2) states that decision making procedure is subject to the 
ordinary legislative procedure in which the Commission submits a proposal to the Council 
and the Parliament and two institutions approve or amend the proposal.4 This shows that 
provisions of Article 194 state the objectives and decision making the procedure of the 
energy policy.  
The EU energy policy is affected by specific provisions and other provisions. Specific 
provisions such as Title VIII- Article 122 of TFEU explains what measures can be taken 
when there is difficulty in the supply of energy.5 Secondly, Title XVI- Article 170-172 of 
TFEU points out the necessity of interconnections of energy networks. There are also 
other provisions which are related to energy. Other provisions such as Title VII- Article 
114 of TFEU deals with internal energy market regulations.6 Secondly, Title V- Article 
216-218 of TFEU defines how the EU engages in agreements with third countries and 
which procedures the EU follows in negotiations.7  
In the 1990s, natural gas and electricity markets were under the control of the member 
states.  The EU Commission and the member states decided to open energy markets of 
the member states for competition and liberalize these markets. As a result, the First 
Energy Package was adopted in 1996 about electricity and in 1998 about natural gas.8 
The Second Energy Package was adopted in 2003. With this package, new electricity and 
                                                          
3 Braun, Jan Frederik. “EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules.” 2011: 3. Working Paper, European 
Policy Institutes Network. 
4 Braun, 11 
5 Gouardères, Frédéric, Veronica McWatt, and Lucile Fleuret. "Energy Policy: General Principles." Fact Sheets on 
the European Union. January 2018. Accessed April 06, 2018. Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.4.7.html  
6 Gouardères, 2018 
7 Braun, 5 
8 Gouardères, Frédéric, Veronica McWatt, and Lucile Fleuret. "Internal Energy Market." European Parliament. 
February 2018:1. Accessed April 6, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_2.1.9.pdf  
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gas suppliers entered into markets of the member states and this enabled European 
consumers to choose their electricity and gas suppliers.9 Competitiveness increased with 
the second package. In 2009, the Third Energy Package was adopted. This package 
amends the second package and includes further liberalization of electricity and gas 
markets.10 These three energy packages are essential steps for liberalizing the EU energy 
market as well completing the internal energy market of the EU. With the unbundling, 
competition increased in the European energy market. 
In 2007, European Council adopted 2020 Energy Strategy: “to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 20% to increase the share of renewable energy to 20% and to make a 20% 
improvement in energy efficiency.”11 In 2015, the greenhouse gas emissions reduced by 
22%, so the EU achieved its 20% reduction aim. In the same year, the share of renewable 
energy rose to 16.7%.12 This means that the EU can achieve its 20% target before 2020. 
11 out of 28 members reached the 20% target of increasing the share of renewables.13 
Regarding the objective of energy efficiency, in 2015, the EU achieved its target of final 
energy consumption, but it could not achieve its target of primary energy consumption. 
Primary energy consumption reduced by 16.9% and a further 3.1% reduction is needed 
until 2020.14 It can be foreseen that the EU will achieve all of its targets until 2020. 
In 2011, the European Commission adopted an energy roadmap called 2050 Strategy for 
sustainable and secure energy. 2050 Strategy is the long-term goal of the EU. Parallel to 
2020 and 2030 Strategies, 2050 Strategy is also an important stepping stone for the 
transition to low carbon economy. With this strategy, the EU aims to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by 80-95% compared to 1990 levels by 2050.15  
In 2014, the EU leaders adopted the 2030 Strategy for Climate and Energy. The new 
strategy was built on the 2020 strategy, and the objectives were set for the years between 
2020 and 2030.16 With this strategy, the EU set “At least 40% cuts in greenhouse gas 
                                                          
9 Aykın, Sibel, Ileana Tache, and Ahmet Başar Karaman. “Energy Policy of the EU and the Role of Turkey in Energy 
Supply Security.” 2017. Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov.Series V: Economic Sciences 10 (2):291 
10 Aykın, 291 
11 "Europe 2020 Indicators- Climate Change and Energy." Eurostat. August 9, 2017. Accessed April 06, 2018. 
Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-
_climate_change_and_energy  
12 "Europe 2020 Indicators- Climate Change and Energy.", 2017 
13 "Renewable Energy Statistics." Eurostat. February 2, 2018. Accessed April 17, 2018. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics  
14 "Europe 2020 Indicators- Climate Change and Energy.", 2017 
15 "2050 Energy Strategy." Energy Strategy and Energy Union. October 09, 2014. Accessed April 06, 2018. 
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/2050-energy-strategy  
16 "2030 Energy Strategy." Energy Strategy and Energy Union. October 09, 2014. Accessed April 06, 2018. 
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/2030-energy-strategy  
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emissions from 1990 levels, at least 27% share for renewable energy, at least 27% 
improvement in energy efficiency”.17 The strategy is vital for the transition to a low-
carbon economy and sustainable development. 
In 2014, the EU Commission released Energy Security Strategy for the EU countries in 
response to gas disruptions to the EU because of two Ukrainian crises. The main aim of 
the strategy is to ensure continuous and abundant supply of energy to the EU.18 In the 
short term, the Commission developed and simulated two scenarios to the EU member 
states. The first scenario was about the complete cessation of Russian gas and the second 
scenario was about disruptions in Russian gas. The results of the scenarios showed that 
long supply disruptions to the EU severely affect Southeast Europe.19  
In the long term, the five key areas were identified for the security of supply of the EU. 
Firstly, increasing energy efficiency by reaching 2020,2030 and 2050 targets. Secondly, 
building and strengthening the energy infrastructure of the EU as well as completing the 
internal energy market. Thirdly, speaking one voice in the external energy affairs. 
Fourthly, strengthening and deepening cooperation between the member states in the field 
of energy. Lastly, increasing sustainable energy production, diversifying supplier 
countries and energy routes.20 
In 2015, the Energy Union was established. The three main objectives of the Energy 
Union are the security of supply, sustainability, and competitiveness.21 The Energy Union 
is grounded in 2030 Strategy and Energy Security Strategy.22 The three long-established 
objectives are supported by five crucial dimensions.23 The first one is security, solidarity, 
and trust. With this dimension, the EU tries to ensure diversification of energy sources of 
the Union and to ensure solidarity and trust between the member states. This dimension 
is essential because the member states firmly adhere to their right to decide on their energy 
policies, energy mix, and suppliers. In this context, foreign policy decisions regarding 
energy are taken independently from each member state rather than collective decision 
                                                          
17 "2030 Climate & Energy Framework." Climate Action. February 16, 2017. Accessed April 06, 2018. Retrieved 
from https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en  
18 “Energy Security Strategy”. European Commission Accessed March 7,2018. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/energy-security-strategy 
19 “Energy Security Strategy”, 2018 
20 “Energy Security Strategy”, 2018 
21 "Energy Union." European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy. March 2016. Accessed April 6, 2018. 
Retrieved from https://www.eceee.org/policy-areas/energy-union/  
22 "Building the Energy Union." Energy Strategy and Energy Union. August 03, 2017. Accessed April 06, 2018. 
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/building-energy-union  




making. Consequently, the EU aims to increase security, solidarity, and trust between 
member states to increase cooperation between member states in the field of energy.24  
The second one is a fully integrated internal energy market. This dimension ensures the 
continuous flow of energy to member states with a strong infrastructure and without 
technical or regulatory barriers.25  Between 1996 and 2009, three legislative packages 
were adopted. The main aim of these packages was to integrate internal energy markets 
of the EU, and they addressed the issues of “market access, transparency, and regulation, 
consumer protection, supporting interconnection and adequate levels of supply.”26  
The third one is energy efficiency. With this dimension, the EU aims to increase the 
efficiency of energy resources, reduce energy imports and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. To increase energy efficiency and environmental protection, the EU developed 
2020,2030 and 2050 strategies. These strategies will not only increase the efficiency and 
environmental protection, but it will also decrease energy bills and energy imports.27 
The fourth one is climate action. In this dimension, the EU tries to ensure to transition to 
a low carbon economy, increase the use of renewable energy and it is committed to 
international climate change agreements. The EU quickly ratified the Paris Agreement, 
which is global climate change action agreement opened for signature in 2015, to show 
its commitment to fight against climate change. Besides, the EU increased the use of 
renewable energies, and it successfully separates economic growth from greenhouse gas 
emissions, so that the Union has decarbonized its economy.28 With 2020, 2030 and 2050 
strategies, the Community aims to transition to low carbon economy. 
The last one is research, innovation, and competitiveness.  In this dimension, the EU 
supports research, innovation and new technologies for clean energy and transition to a 
low carbon economy.29 All these accelerate the process of transition to clean energy and 
low carbon economy. Research, innovation, and competitiveness are supported by the 
Investment Plan for Europe and European Fund for Strategic Investment which are 
funding tools of the European Commission and the European Investment Bank.30  
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28 Aykın, 292-293 
29 "Building the Energy Union.", 2017 
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In 2016, the Commission adopted regulation about the Governance of the Energy Union 
with a view to affecting convergence on energy policies and building deeper cooperation 
among the member states. The regulation is vital for the management of the Energy 
Union. The goals of the governance of the Energy Union are: 
• Bring together energy and climate actions as well as actions in other 
relevant policy areas, leading to more and longer-term policy coherence. 
This also provides long-term certainty and guidance for investors; 
• Secure implementation of the internal energy market and the delivery of 
the 2030 energy and climate framework, notably the implementation of 
the agreed 2030 targets on renewables, energy efficiency, non-Emissions 
Trading System and interconnections;  
• Streamline current planning and reporting requirements, avoiding 
unnecessary administrative burden; 
• Involve an energy dialogue with stakeholders to inform policy-making 
and support active engagement in managing the energy transition; 
• Deepen the cooperation between the Member States, including at the 
regional level, and with the Commission; 
• Improve the data, analysis, and intelligence needed to underpin the 
Energy Union by pooling the relevant knowledge and making it easily 
accessible to all stakeholders, and 
• Annual reporting to the European Parliament and the Council on the state 
of the Energy Union in order to address the key issues and steer the policy 
debate.31  
As a normative power32, the European Union gives importance to the implementation of 
the external dimension of internal policies in many areas. Regarding energy, three factors 
are the most important: “Diversification, speaking with one voice and a properly 
developed internal energy system.”33 With diversification, the Union aims to increase the 
number of energy partners in order not to become overdependent on one country. With 
speaking as one voice, the EU tries to create a common energy interest and a collective 
                                                          
31 "Energy Union.", 2016. 
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with the third parties.  
33 Maciulis, Vitas. “The External Dimension of the EU's Energy Policy.” European Economic and Social Committee. 




spirit in energy. With a developed internal energy system, the Community intends to 
create a strong internal energy market and to break external influences. In the following 








Energy is on the agenda of the European Union already in the very beginning of the 
European integration process. European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was 
founded in 1951 and EURATOM which was founded in 1957 are two important 
institutions for securing energy supply of the member states. For many years, the 
European Commission together with the European Parliament tried to include specific 
objectives and decision-making procedure regarding energy to the treaty law.34 However, 
the efforts of the two institutions failed repeatedly because member states were reluctant 
to transfer competencies to the supranational institutions of the Union in the energy 
matters. Treaty of Maastricht underlined the importance of energy security and policy, so 
that energy became one of the priority areas for the Community. However, the treaty did 
not spell out specific objectives about the member state cooperation.35   
With the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, specific policy objectives for energy was defined. Besides, 
the treaty included a mandate for policymaking in energy matters. The Community has 
made several attempts to extend energy policy making in supranational level, and it 
finally included a separate part on energy in the last treaty.36 However, member states 
still firmly adhere to their right to decide on their energy policies, energy mix, and 
suppliers. For this reason, it can be concluded that the European institutions cannot 
interfere in the autonomy of the member states in energy matters. As a result, the 
                                                          
34 Tosun Jale, Sophie Biesenbender, and Kai Schulze. “Energy Policy Making in the EU.” 2015: 23. Springer. 
35 Tekin, Ali, and Paul Williams. “Geo-Politics Of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus: The European Union, Russia And 
Turkey”. 2010: 13. Springer. 
36 Tosun, 23 
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supranational body cannot go beyond calling for cooperation and facilitating dialogue 
between the member states. 
Speaking with one voice is one of desire for the EU. Representation as a single body in 
relations with energy producing and transit countries can increase the bargaining power 
of the Union. Also, it can solve energy-related problems since all members would take a 
common stance. In principle, member states agree on speaking with one voice, but they 
are reluctant to transfer their rights to supranational authorities. This situation can be 
better explained with intergovernmentalism.  
According to intergovernmentalists, states choose to cooperate when the costs for non-
cooperation are high. During cooperation, national interests of the countries are at the 
forefront, so interests of the countries determine the level of cooperation. Thus, 
cooperation can fail when the outcome and national interests clash. Besides, distribution 
of benefits can create conflicts between the countries. At this point, intergovernmentalism 
assumes that in order to overcome conflict, states choose the best option that is close to 
national interests or status quo.37 The concrete example of this issue is the construction 
of Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Poland and the Baltic countries perceive the pipeline as a 
threat to the energy security of the Union while Germany, Austria, and some Western 
European countries have a perspective that the pipeline has nothing to do with energy 
security of the European Union.38 Besides, German officials stated that the pipeline could 
lower gas prices in Germany, so the pipeline will be beneficial for Germany.39 This 
demonstrates that European countries act along with their national interests and they 
interpret energy security differently. 
National energy preferences and policies increase vulnerability to the pressures coming 
from energy-exporting countries. Different approaches regarding energy policies, energy 
mix, and energy suppliers by member states can undermine the formation of harmonized 
energy policy as well as energy security.40 Western European countries, especially, 
Southeast European countries are dependent on gas coming from Russia, but it was 
Southeast European countries that were severely affected by the two Ukrainian crises. 
                                                          
37 Tekin, 28 
38 Keating, Dave. "Angela Merkel May Be Souring On Russia's Nord Stream." Forbes. April 10, 2018. Accessed May 
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These countries were dependent on the Soviet era pipelines carrying gas from Russia to 
Western Europe through their territory. In 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises, Russia 
stopped providing gas to Ukraine, which was a result of its claim that Ukraine did not pay 
for all gas it imported. Thereupon, Ukraine reduced gas flows to European countries by 
taking gas from the pipelines to meet its demand.  
In fact, energy security became one of the priorities for the European Union after Central 
and Eastern enlargement. Therefore, different national approaches to energy matters and 
uncoordinated energy policies not only jeopardize energy security of the Southeast 








Europe is not an energy-rich continent, so there is a considerable gap between energy 
production and consumption within the European continent. The table below shows the 
production and consumption of oil, natural gas, and coal in the European Union between 
2006 and 2016. In each source, both production and consumption declined in 10 years. 
However, the fall in production is much higher than the fall in consumption. In other 
words, in 10 years, production in oil, gas, and coal declined by 39%, 41,4%, and 30,8% 
respectively. On the other hand, consumption in these three sources declined by 15,6%, 
12,5%, and 27,1% respectively. While the biggest decline in production occurred in 
natural gas, the least decline in consumption again occurred in the same source. As a 
result, the Union has been relying more on imports, mainly on natural gas, to fill the gap 







Table 1: Production and Consumption of Oil, Natural Gas, and Coal in Million Tonnes 
of Oil Equivalent (Mtoe)41 
The table indicates that oil production decreased in a decade due to a lack of resources 
for production. Until 2014, oil consumption decreased significantly, but then it started to 
increase due to demand coming from transportation and industry sectors and a decline in 
oil prices.  
Like oil, the natural gas production also shows a declining trend between 2006 and 2016. 
Since 2014, the Netherlands, which is the biggest gas producer of the EU, has decreased 
its gas production to reduce possibilities of an earthquake. Therefore, gas production and 
net exports of the country have fallen since 2014.42 The country exports gas to France, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.43 As a consequence, these 
countries need to find alternative gas suppliers. The second biggest gas producer of the 
Union, the UK, leaving the Union. Therefore, the total gas production of the community 
will decrease significantly. Contrary to oil demand, natural gas demand has ups and 
downs. Especially after 2014, natural gas consumption started to increase. This can be 
attributed to declining natural gas prices as well as Russia’s ability to supply a vast 
amount of cheap gas to Europe. Declining trend in gas consumption between 2010 and 
2014 can be attributed to the increase in energy efficiency thanks to climate strategies of 
the Union.  
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Coal production in the Union decreased in ten years. The significant decline occurred 
especially after 2012. The production falls because of the EU’s desire to transition to a 
low carbon economy. Until 2012, coal consumption had fluctuations. After 2012, coal 
demand started to go down in line with the fall in coal production. All these shows that 
the production of oil, natural gas, and coal are insignificant to meet the demand from 
these sources. 
Table 2: Tpes, Production, and Imports44 
Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES), which is the total energy supply that is used 
domestically, of the EU increased from 1990 to 2005, and then it decreased between 2005 
and 2014. One of the main reason for this fall is because of the significant decline in 
energy production. Then, in 2015, TPES of the EU slightly increased since imports of the 
Union increased. In total, TPES of the European Union decreased by 3.6% in 25 years. 
Regarding energy production, total energy production of the Union has fallen from 1990 
to 2015 which accounts for 19%. This is mainly because the EU is not an energy-rich 
continent. Regarding imports, from 1990 to 2005, imports of the EU raised significantly. 
Between 2005 and 2014, imports of the EU have fallen, and the imports rose again in 
2015. One of the reasons for the fall in imports is because of the two Ukrainian crises and 
increase in energy efficiency. The imports of the Union increased by around 20% in 25 
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Figure 1: Tpes of the EU (Mtoe)45 
In the TPES of the EU, oil has the highest share. It was followed by natural gas and coal. 
From 1990 to 2015, the share of coal has fallen gradually. Even though oil has had the 
highest share from 1990 to 2015, its share also decreased. On the other hand, from 1990 
to 2015, the shares of natural gas and renewable energy rose significantly. This is because 
after the nuclear accident in Fukushima in 2011, the European countries have increased 
their reliance on renewable energy and natural gas and they have phased out their nuclear 
power plants.46 Consequently, fossil fuels continue to possess the highest share in the 
TPES of the EU.  
Total Final Consumption (TFC), which is an aggregate of energy used by consumers, of 
the European Union accounted 1113.5 Mtoe in 2015.47 The greatest energy-consuming 
sector in the EU is the transportation sector with 368.5 Mtoe. The second greatest energy 
demand came from the housing sector with 282.8 Mtoe. Industry sector followed the 
housing sector and consumed 281.7 Mtoe in 2015. Finally, service sector consumed 151.4 
Mtoe. The remaining 29.1 Mtoe was used in other sectors such as agriculture and 
forestry.48  
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As stated before, the energy production of the EU has declined. This situation pushes the 
member states to import crude oil, coal and natural gas from other states. According to 
the International Energy Agency report (IEA), the EU imported 539.67 Mtoe of oil, 
112.31 Mtoe of coal and 247.22 Mtoe of natural gas in 2015.49  
Table 3: The Imports of Crude Oil from Main Trading Partners50 
Table 3 illustrates that EU imports crude oil mainly from 13 countries with Russia on the 
lead with the share of 28.6%. It is evident in the table that the EU has many trading 
partners in crude oil. This stems from the portability of crude oil. In other words, the 
Community can diversify oil and coal because it can be transferred by ships which make 
the trade of oil and coal more flexible compared to the trade of gas. In the case of natural 
gas, it is mostly transferred through pipelines to the European continent.  
Table 4: The Imports of Natural Gas Shares of Main Trading Partners51 
                                                          
49 “World Energy Balances.”, 611-619 
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EU28_imports_of_petroleum_oil,_crude_and_NLG,_main_trading_partners,_2015.png&oldid=305798  
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Table 4 indicates that the EU imports natural gas mainly from six countries. Among them, 
Russia is the biggest gas supplier of the EU with 38.5% in 2015. This demonstrates that 
Russia has a prominent place in the European energy market, especially in the areas of 
crude oil and natural gas. In 2017, the EU imported 360 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas 
mainly from Russia (43%), Norway (34%), Algeria+ Libya (11%) and the remaining gas 
(12%) was imported in the form of LNG.52  It is clear that the share of Russia in the 
European market rose to 43%. Compared to 2015, Russia increased its share by around 
5%.53  
Norwegian gas feeds Northwestern part of the EU while Algeria and Libya feed 
Southwestern part of Europe. The remaining Central and Eastern parts of Europe are fed 
Russian gas, so Russia supplies gas to more European countries than Norway and African 
countries supply. That is why the country has the highest share in the European Union 
market. It is clear that the EU does not have many trading partners in natural gas like in 
crude oil. The main reason for that, as stated above, is because natural gas is mostly 
transferred through pipelines to the EU. Even though the EU imports natural gas in the 
form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), the share of imports via pipelines are much higher 
than LNG imports of the Union since Russia supply cheap gas to Europe. The issue will 
be elaborated in the last chapter. 
Statistics in the table below demonstrate that 10 out of 28 countries imported crude oil 
from Russia along with more than 50% share. As shown above, member states’ 
dependency on Russia varies. Even though around 1/3 of the EU member states imported 
oil from Russia, the EU countries can diversify crude oil imports by increasing the number 
of countries that export crude oil. Hence, here it should be noted that import dependency 
on oil is not as crucial as the import dependency of natural gas. The reason for this is 
because pipelines create import dependency on the exporter countries. In the case of 
interruptions in gas supplies, it is harder to find an alternative quickly. Thus, this affects 
the energy security of the importing country. 
                                                          
explained/index.php?title=File:ExtraEU28_imports_of_natural_gas_(liquefied,_gaseous_state),_shares_(%25)_of_m
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52 “Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets." Market Observatory for Energy, 4th ser., 10, no. 4 (2018). Accessed 
April 8, 2018. Retrieved from 
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Table 5: The Share of Russia in National Imports54 
Natural gas is the energy source that is imported by the EU in higher volumes. Again, 
Russia takes the lead in the natural gas market of Europe. According to Eurostat statistics 
in 2015, 12 of the EU states depend on Russian gas between 75%-100%. (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Finland). Also, 3 EU countries depend on Russian gas between 50%-75% 
(Germany, Greece, and Italy). It is evident in the statistics that 15 out of 28 members 
imported natural gas from Russia with more than 50% share.  
Compared to crude oil, natural gas coming from Russia dominates the EU market because 
more than half of the European states imported natural gas from Russia. Interestingly, 
many countries in the statistics that are highly dependent on Russian energy were once 
under the influence of the Soviets. Consequently, it can be inferred that Russia today 
continues to control the former Soviet zone by the means of energy resources. In order to 
depict a clear picture of the gas trade of the EU, current and planned pipelines will be 
explained in the next part. 
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Figure 2: Current and Future Pipelines of the EU55 




The EU has currently 14 pipelines that import natural gas from different countries. There 
are four pipelines from South-Western corridor, four pipelines from North-Eastern 
corridor, five pipelines from the North- Western corridor and one interconnector from 




1.4.1. North- Eastern Corridor 
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1.4.1.1. Yamal Pipeline 
 
 
One of the oldest natural gas pipelines between Russia and Europe was built in 1996 
named Yamal-Europe. It starts in Russia passes through Belarus and Poland and finally 
ends in Germany. The length of the pipeline is over 2000km, and it can carry 33 bcm of 
natural gas.56 After the Ukrainian crisis, new pipeline routes were planned and are still 
being built. These new pipelines aim to bypass transit countries and deliver natural gas 
directly to Europe. Yamal gas fields are the biggest fields in the world, so the pipeline 




1.4.1.2. Nord Stream 
 
 
Nord Stream pipeline was built to reach the European market directly. The construction 
of the pipeline started in 2010 and ended in 2012.57 The pipeline has the capacity to 
transfer 55 bcm of natural gas per year.58 It starts in Russia and ends in Germany. The 
length of the pipeline is around 1300km, and the main targeted markets are Germany, 
Netherlands, Denmark, France and other EU countries.59  With the Nord Stream, Russia 
bypasses transit countries, and it supplies gas directly to Europe. Direct supply is vital for 
the continuous supply of gas. In two Ukrainian crises, European countries which were 
taking gas via Ukraine transit pipelines severely affected from gas disruptions to Ukraine 
while gas supplies continued to Germany. To bypass Ukraine and to increase direct 
supply, the EU and Russia agreed for the construction of Nord Stream 2 pipeline which 
is identical with the first pipeline.  
 
                                                          
56 "Transportation." Gazprom Export. 2018. Accessed April 06, 2018. Retrieved from 
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/transportation/  
57 “The pipeline”. Nord Stream. Accessed April 06, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.nord-stream.com/the-
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1.4.1.3. Brotherhood Pipeline 
 
 
The oldest natural gas pipeline between Russia and Europe was built in 1967 named as 
Brotherhood Pipeline. The pipeline has the capacity to transfer 100 bcm of gas per year, 
and its length is more than 4500 km.60 The pipeline starts in Russia passes through 
Ukraine and reaches to Slovakia. In Slovakia, the pipeline split into two branches. One 
branch goes to the Czech Republic, and the other branch goes to Austria. The Brotherhood 
pipeline is essential to supply Russian gas to Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, and 
Hungary. After the two Ukrainian crises, Russia has reduced its reliance on Ukraine as a 
transit country, and it looked for alternative routes to bypass Ukraine.61 Also, the 
infrastructure of this pipeline requires new investments and improvements since it is 




1.4.1.4. Trans-Balkan Pipeline 
 
 
The pipeline was constructed in 1986, and it has the capacity to transfer 6 bcm of gas per 
year in the initial phase.62 The pipeline starts in Russia and passes from Ukraine, 
Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and finally reaches Turkey. The length of the pipeline is 
over 1000km. With the construction of the second phase, the total capacity of this pipeline 
rose to around 14 bcm of gas per year.63 Since this pipeline is also using Ukraine as a 
transit, Russia will decrease supplies from this route in 2019. After 2019, Russia aims to 
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connect Turkish stream to Trans- Balkan pipeline, and it aims to reverse the existing 




1.4.2. North- Western Corridor 
 
 
1.4.2.1. Europipe 1 
 
 
The pipeline started its operations in 1995, and it was designed to supply gas from 
Norway to Germany. The length of the pipeline is 620km, and it has 16 bcm of gas 




1.4.2.2. Europipe 2 
 
 
The pipeline is the second route for Norway to supply its gas to Germany. Europipe 2 
was commenced in 1999. The capacity of the pipeline is 25 bcm of gas, and the length of 
the pipeline is 658km.66 Europipe 1 and Europipe 2 have total 41 bcm of gas carrying 
capacity to Germany. 
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Norpipe commenced in 1977 which was designed to supply gas from Norway to Germany 
and Netherlands. The length of the pipeline is 443km, and it has 11 bcm of gas capacity 








The pipeline designed to supply gas from Norway to France. Gas flows started in Franpipe 
in 1998. The pipeline can carry 19 bcm of gas per year, and the length of the pipeline is 
840km.69 Considering that France imported 46,4 bcm70 and the country imported 16,6 
bcm of gas from this pipeline in 201671, Norwegian gas accounts for around 36% of 







Zeepipe is a direct pipeline between Norway and Belgium. The operations of the pipeline 
started in 1997. Zeepipe can carry 15 bcm of gas, and the length of the pipeline is 
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814km.72 In 2016, Belgium imported 18,3 bcm in total73, and the country imported 14,4 
bcm of gas from Norway.74 This means that Norwegian gas accounts for around 79% of 




1.4.3. South-Eastern Corridor 
 
 
1.4.3.1. Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) 
 
 
In 2007, the representatives of Turkey, Greece, and Italy signed the new pipeline project 
that interconnects natural gas systems of these countries. The EU gave particular attention 
to the pipeline and supported its construction.75 The pipeline starts in Turkey, passes 
through Greece and reaches Italy. The capacity of the pipeline is around 11.3 bcm of gas. 
In 2016, Turkey exported 0.6 bcm of gas to Greece.76 The length of the pipeline is around 
300 km. Turkey- Greece interconnector started its operations in 2007, but there is little 
progress has been made on the part of Greece and Italy.77 Currently, the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) is under construction. The pipeline will connect gas infrastructures of 




1.4.4. South-Western Corridor 
 
 
                                                          
72 “European Gas Atlas 2015.”,15 
73 “Gas Trade Flows in Europe”, 2018 
74 "Exports of Norwegian Oil and Gas.", 2018 
75 “Interconnection Turkey Greece Italy (ITGI) Pipeline” Hydrocarbons Technology. 2017. Accessed March 09, 
2018. Retrieved from https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/turkeygreeceitalypip/  
76 “Gas Trade Flows in Europe”, 2018 
77 “Interconnection Turkey Greece Italy (ITGI) Pipeline”, 2017 
27 
 
1.4.4.1. Maghreb- Europe Pipeline 
 
 
The pipeline aims to transfer Algerian natural gas to Europe. The construction of the 
pipeline started in the 1990s, and the pipeline was ready for service in 1996. The pipeline 
is around 1600 km, and it passes from territories of Algeria and Morocco, and then 
reaches Spain. Between 2002-2005, the capacity of the pipeline was expanded. Now, the 
pipeline has the capacity to transfer 12 bcm of gas per year.78 Algeria is one of the most 
important gas exporting countries to Europe. However, Algerian gas production is not 
efficient due to lack of investments and sufficient infrastructure. It is expected that 








Medgaz pipeline is a pipeline between Algeria and Spain. The pipeline started its 
operations in 2007. The pipeline has a capacity of 8 bcm of gas, and the length of the 
pipeline is 210km.80 Together with Maghreb- Europe Pipeline, Algerian gas is transported 
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1.4.4.3. Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline 
 
 
The construction of the pipeline was completed in 1983, and in the same year, deliveries 
started to Italy. The pipeline is around 1500 km.81 It starts in Algeria, passes from the 
territories of Tunisia and reaches Italy. The initial capacity of the pipeline was 12 bcm of 
gas. In 1996, the capacity was expanded to 20 bcm which is also the current capacity of 







Libya was able to export natural gas to Europe in 2004 with the completion of the 
Greenstream project. It is a direct pipeline between Libya and Italy. The pipeline is around 
600km, and it has the capacity to transfer 8 bcm of gas per year.83 The civil war in 2011 
gave massive damage to production and exports of natural gas. Libya increased its 
production after the war, but it is still low compared to the pre-war era.84 
Figure 3: Southwestern Corridor of the EU85 
                                                          
81 "Focus Snam." Enipedia. Accessed April 06, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.eni.com/enipedia/en_IT/news-
archive/events/focus-snam.page  
82 "ENI in Algeria." ENI in the World. 2017. Accessed April 06, 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.eni.com/en_IT/eni-world/country.shtml#algeria  
83 "Country Analysis Brief: Libya." The U.S. Energy Information Administration. November 19, 2015: 10. Accessed 
March 8, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.iberglobal.com/files/2016-2/libia_eia.pdf  
84 "Country Analysis Brief: Libya.", 10 
85 Attanasi, Emil D., and Philip A. Freeman. “Role of Stranded Gas from Central Asia and Russia in Meeting 
Europe’s Future Import Demand for Gas”. 2012. Natural Resources Research 21 (2): 206. 
29 
 




In the European continent, new pipelines were decided to be constructed to meet the gas 
demand. In North-Eastern Corridor, Russia decided to build Nord Stream 2 to bypass 
Ukraine and to supply gas directly to the European market. In South-Eastern Corridor, 
four pipelines were decided to build by the Union to bring gas from the Caspian and 
Mediterranean regions. However, to respond to the diversification efforts of the EU, 
Russia is now building Turkish Stream in the same corridor to protect its domination. 
Besides, one pipeline is decided to be initiated by the EU in South-Western corridor to 
bring gas from North Africa. All these demonstrate that the Community concentrates on 




1.5.1. North-Eastern Corridor 
 
 
1.5.1.1. Nord Stream 2 
 
 
To bypass Ukraine and to supply gas directly to Europe, Russia decided for the 
construction of Nord Stream 2. The project is designed in order to meet the gas demands 
of the EU customers. Also, the project is inspired by the success of the first version of the 
pipeline. The route of the second pipeline is identical with the first pipeline. This means 
that the project starts in Russia and ends in Germany. The length and capacity of the 
pipeline are also the same as the first pipeline which means that it has a length of 1300km 
and it will carry 55 bcm of natural gas. Construction of the project started in 2017, and it 
is projected to be completed end of the year 2019.86 The importance of the pipeline is that 
                                                          




more gas will be supplied to Germany and other European countries and the pipeline will 
contribute to Germany’s efforts of becoming an energy hub. However, the project caused 
divergence among the members of the Union. Poland and the Baltic countries fear from 
increasing dependency on Russian gas while Germany and the other Western European 
countries claim that the pipeline will contribute to the energy security of the European 




1.5.2. South-Eastern Corridor 
 
 
1.5.2.1. Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) 
 
 
The construction of the TAP project started in 2016. The operations of the pipeline are 
expected to start in 2020. The capacity of the pipeline is around 10 bcm of gas, but it can 
be expanded to over 20 bcm with additional investments.88 The length of the pipeline is 
around 880km. The pipeline will start in Greece, passes through Albania and reaches to 
Italy.89 This project will be the expansions of Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and 
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). This means that Azeri gas will be carried via Turkey to 
Greece and Italy. The pipeline is vital for the energy security of the European Union. 
Azeri gas has a potential to compete with Russian gas, so that it can break Russian 




                                                          
87 Keating, 2018 
88 “Trans Adriatic Pipeline” TAP. 2018. Accessed March 09, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.tap-ag.com/the-
pipeline  
89 “Trans Adriatic Pipeline”, 2018 
31 
 
1.5.2.2. Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) 
 
 
The pipeline is proposed to connect gas infrastructures of Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania. The pipeline is designed to connect to TAP, so 
that Azeri gas will be carried to Adriatic countries. The length of the pipeline is around 
500km.90 The construction of the project is expected to start after 2019, and it will carry 
5 bcm of gas to four Adriatic countries.91 The importance of the pipeline is that it will 
carry Azeri gas and these countries will able to switch to Azeri gas. Besides obtaining gas 
from the TAP, the project can also carry LNG to Adriatic countries with the completion 
of LNG facility in Croatia. 
Figure 4: Trans Adriatic and Ionian Adriatic Pipelines92 
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1.5.2.3. Eastring Pipeline 
 
 
Eastring Pipeline is developed to help Central European and Balkan countries to diversify 
their natural gas resources. The project will connect the gas infrastructures of Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. In phase one, the annual capacity will be 20 
bcm of gas per year. With the initiation of the second phase, the annual capacity is 
expected to rise to 40 bcm per year.93 The length of the pipeline is around 1000 km. The 
construction of the project has not started yet, but it is planned to finish in 2022.94 The 
pipeline can be connected to Turkish stream or TANAP in Turkey. If it is connected to 
TANAP, the project can play a substantial role to increase the energy security of 
Southeast European countries. As stated before, Azeri gas will compete with Russian gas 
in Europe with the realization of the new pipelines. In the case that Azerbaijan will 
produce and supply more gas to Europe via TANAP in the future, Azeri gas has a potential 
to decrease import dependencies of Southeast European countries on Russian gas. If it is 




1.5.2.4. Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline (EMP) 
 
 
The pipeline is designed to carry Israeli gas to Europe. EMP will start in Israel, it will 
pass from the island Cyprus and Greece, and finally, it will reach Italy. The Eastern 
Mediterranean Pipeline (EMP) will have the capacity to transfer around 12-16 bcm of 
gas, and the length of the pipeline is around 2000km.95 Although the pipeline has both 
financial and technical difficulties because of its undersea route, in 2017, three countries 
signed a memorandum for the construction of the pipeline by 2019. The parties set a target 
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to 2025 for the completion of the project.96 However, technical and financial difficulties 
decrease the likelihood of the construction of the pipeline. Considering that the capacities 
of the newly discovered reserves in the Mediterranean are low compared to the high gas 
demand in Europe, who will finance the pipeline is the biggest question. The prospects 




1.5.2.5. South Stream-Turkish Stream 
 
 
South Stream pipeline was a proposed pipeline that was suspended by the EU. The 
pipeline designed to start in Russia, and it has two branches. The one goes to Bulgaria 
and reaches to Adriatic countries, and the other branch goes to Romania and reaches 
Central European countries.97 It was planned to transfer 63 bcm of natural gas per year. 
Even though it was started to be built in 2013, “The European Commission put pressure 
on Bulgaria to freeze South Stream, citing breaches of the EU law in the 
intergovernmental agreement for the construction of the pipeline.”98The reason for the 
EU to be skeptic about South Stream project is that it may favor Bulgaria over the other 
European states because Bulgaria would get income through transit fees which can violate 
competition rules of the EU. On the other hand, Bulgaria insisted on the construction of 
the South Stream project because the country is 100% dependent on Russian gas.99  
In 2014, by seeing intense debates in the EU, Russia replaced South Stream project with 
Turkish stream project. This means that the South stream project failed. The new project 
starts in Russia and ends in Turkey.100 With this project, Turkey will transfer Russian gas 
to the EU and Turkey can import more gas from Russia for its domestic consumption. 
The pipeline has a length of 900km, and the construction of the pipeline started in 2017. 
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It is expected to finish in late 2019.101 There will be two identical pipelines built 
alongside. The first one will provide gas to Turkey, and the other one will provide gas to 
Europe. The two lines have a total capacity of around 32 bcm of gas.102  
Even though Turkey and Russia agreed on the construction of the project in 2014, the 
construction started in 2017. The main reason for this delay is because of a short-term 
dispute between Turkey and Russia. In 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian plane. As a 
consequence, Russia suspended Turkish stream project. The relations normalized in 2017 
when Turkey apologized for shooting the jet.103 The project will strengthen the position 
of Turkey in the region since Turkey will get transit fees and it will become a transfer 
station for transferring Russian gas to the EU. For Europe, around 2 bcm additional gas 
will be supplied by Russia to the EU since Trans-Balkan pipeline will be replaced by 
Turkish Stream. This demonstrates that Russia tries to consolidate its domination over 




1.5.3. South-Western Corridor 
 
 
1.5.3.1. Galsi Pipeline 
 
 
After the Ukrainian crises, Algeria and Italy agreed on the construction of the new 
pipeline. The pipeline will directly transfer Algerian gas to Italy. The construction of the 
pipeline commenced in 2014, and it is expected to be in service in 2018. The length of 
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the project is 900km, and it has the capacity to carry 8 bcm of gas per year.104 Galsi 








As noted above, the turning point in energy relations between Russia and the EU was 
2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises. In both crises, the European Union was not part of the 
conflict. However, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine led to gas disruptions to the 
European countries. Since Russia is the biggest gas supplier to the EU and Ukraine is the 
main transit country to carry Russian gas to Europe, the conflict between the two parties 
affected European countries especially Southeast European countries severely. After the 
two crises, the Community has taken the necessary measures for securing its energy 
supply. 
In 2004, Russia announced that it raised gas prices to European levels and demanded 
Ukraine to pay European prices which is 160-230$ mcm. Before this proposal, Ukraine 
paid 50-80$ mcm for Russian gas. The deterioration of the relations between Ukraine and 
Russia coincided with a period that gas and oil prices were on the rise.105 This means that 
Russia intended to increase its revenues coming from energy sales. Ukraine was reluctant 
to pay higher prices for gas because they did not have enough financial capacity to pay 
higher prices.  
Russian company Gazprom came with two offers. The company offered to give a loan, 
or if Ukrainians accepted the new price, the new price would be suspended for three 
months. Both of the proposals were rejected by Ukraine.106 On the 1st day of 2006, Russia 
                                                          
104 "Sonatrach and Edison in Talk Again about Shelved GALSI Pipeline Project." 2b1stconsulting. September 5, 
2014. Accessed April 6, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.2b1stconsulting.com/sonatrach-and-edison-in-talk-again-
about-shelved-galsi-pipeline-project/  
105 Stern, Jonathan. “The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006.” January 16, 2006: 6. Accessed April 08, 
2018. Retrieved from https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Jan2006-
RussiaUkraineGasCrisis-JonathanStern.pdf  
106 Stern, 7 
36 
 
cut gas supplies to Ukraine. The dispute ended three days later, and the two parties signed 
a contract.107 The crisis told Europeans that it was not wise to be overdependent on a 
single supplier. Even though European countries were not part of the conflict, they were 
severely affected by the dispute. Besides, the EU only watched the developments and 
called parties for the resolution of the dispute.108  
The tensions between Ukraine and Russia increased again with the 2009 Ukrainian crisis. 
At the end of 2008, Russia and Ukraine needed to renew their contract because the old 
contract had expired. At that time, Russia insisted on applying higher prices while 
Ukrainians were reluctant to pay higher prices because they were in economic crisis and 
they had huge debts to Russia.109 In order to sign a gas contract, first, two parties need to 
agree on a price. However, they could not agree on a price. Afterward, the Russian side 
warned Ukraine that if no agreement would be reached, the supplies could be cut off.110 
The crisis started when Russian officials claimed that Ukraine stole the gas that goes to 
Europe. At the same time, Ukrainian officials declared that they required technical fuel 
which is essential for the operation of the gas industry in order to supply gas to Europe.111 
For this reason, Ukrainians refused to pay for non-delivered gas. On the other side, 
Russian officials argued that they sent correct volumes of gas and warned Ukrainians to 
pay their debts. When Ukrainians declared that they refused to pay their debts, Russians 
decreased the gas supply in the middle of winter.112 
In the following day, Russia completely cut off the gas supply to Ukraine.113 Russian gas 
was transmitted to Europe through Ukraine. For this reason, with this crisis, the European 
countries remained gasless, and they were affected severely in the middle of winter. At 
the peak of the crisis, the EU established a monitoring mission which consists of experts 
from both Ukraine and Russia to solve the dispute immediately. However, “The EU has 
the little technical capability, has little political credibility or leverage with either Ukraine 
or Russia and it was unable or unwilling to provide the financial resources to resolve the 
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crisis.”114 As a result, the involvement of the EU in the dispute made no difference, and 
it did not solve the conflicting issue. The dispute ended when Russia and Ukraine reached 
a new agreement on supply and transit tariffs after 20 days of the beginning of the 
conflict.115 After solving the dispute, Russia started to resupply gas to Ukraine and 
Europe.  
The crisis pushed Russia to use alternative routes to supply its gas to Europe. In 2017, 
Ukraine remained the main transit route for carrying Russian gas to the EU. The route 
carried around 40% of Russian gas to Europe. On the other hand, Nord Stream carried 
around 35% and the remaining 25% Russian gas supplied through Belarus transit 
pipelines.116 Even though Ukraine transit pipelines has the highest share among the 
Russian supply routes to Europe, its share has decreased. On the contrary, the shares of 
Belarus transit pipelines and Nord Stream have increased.117 Russia declared that it would 
decrease gas supplies over Ukraine transit pipelines by 2019.118 To bypass Ukraine, 
Turkish Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines were developed, and they are now under 
construction. 
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Figure 5: 2009 Ukrainian Crises and Shortcoming Gas Supplies119 
The dispute showed the Europeans not to depend on one country because it affects the 
member states seriously even though they were not involved in the dispute. It can be 
observed from the figure that Southeast European countries received the greatest harm in 
the 2009 crisis. As stated earlier, Northwestern European countries import gas from 
Norway and Southwestern European countries import gas from North African countries, 
so these countries were not affected severely by the gas disruptions. Besides, since Russia 
directly supplies its gas to the Baltics, these countries were not also affected seriously by 
the crisis. On the contrary, more than 75% of the gas supplies were disrupted to European 
countries which were taking gas from Ukraine transit pipelines. Russia’s cut off gas 
seriously harmed these states because these countries do not have any other option than 
importing Russian gas. 
Besides, the crisis showed that Russia could use its energy as a weapon against Ukraine 
and Europe. Although this decreases the reputation of Russia as a reliable supplier, the 
European countries still rely heavily on Russian energy. This is because the European 
energy companies signed long-term contracts (15-25 years) with Russia.120 For this 
reason, it is hard for the European states to reduce the volumes of gas that is taken from 
                                                          





Russia because they signed long-term contracts with Russia. Consequently, Russia has 
been able to remain as the greatest supplier of gas to Europe. 
It is argued by some scholars that with Ukrainian crisis, Russia aimed to destabilize 
Ukraine economically and politically, punish Ukraine because of its pro-EU and pro-
NATO policies and force Ukraine to support itself in the conflict with Georgia.121 This 
shows that Russia can use its energy resources as political leverage to gain support for its 
actions. The European countries realized that Russia could use its energy as a political 
tool. For this reason, after the two Ukrainian crises, the Union took several important 
decisions and measures to prevent the same thing from happening again. For short and 
medium term, the EU formed European Energy Strategy and Energy Union, and it started 
to look for alternative gas supply routes. For the medium and long term, the EU developed 
2020,2030 and 2050 strategies to increase energy efficiency, to reduce greenhouse gas 








Energy has an essential place in the EU politics. Because energy production of the Union 
is low, the Community relies on imports of energy. Even though the EU imports crude 
oil, natural gas and coal from other countries, the attention was given to the natural gas. 
The primary objectives of the energy policy of the EU are the security of supply, 
developed internal energy system, sustainability, energy efficiency and competitiveness. 
To reach its objectives, the EU has made several reforms. From 1998 to 2009, the EU 
adopted three energy packages, and these packages are about the liberalization of the 
electricity and gas markets. From 2007 to 2014, 2020, 2030 and 2050 strategies were 
adopted. These strategies are essential for the transition to low carbon economy, increase 
efficiency and to secure the energy supply. In 2014, the EU established Energy Security 
Strategy, and in 2015, the Energy Union was founded. These developments accelerated 




after the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises. 2006 crisis lasted for three days while the 2009 
crisis lasted for 20 days. Gas disruptions with these two crises affected the EU and 
Southeast European countries severely. After the crises, the EU accelerated its reforms, 
and it started to look for alternative suppliers. 
The EU has currently 14 pipelines that import natural gas from different countries. There 
are four pipelines from North-Eastern corridor, five pipelines from North-Western 
corridor, four pipelines from South-Western corridor and one interconnector from South-
Eastern corridor. In the European continent, new pipelines were decided to be built to 
meet the gas demand. In North-Eastern Corridor, Russia decided to build Nord Stream 2 
to bypass Ukraine and to supply gas directly to the European market. In South-Eastern 
Corridor, four pipelines were decided to be built by the Union to bring gas from the 
Caspian and Mediterranean regions. However, to respond diversification efforts of the 
EU, Russia is now building Turkish Stream in the same corridor to protect its domination. 
Furthermore, one pipeline is decided to build by the EU in South-Western corridor to 
bring gas from North Africa. All these demonstrate that the Community concentrates on 
its South-Eastern corridor to diversify Russian gas. 
In the next chapter, nine energy producing countries from different regions will be 
examined to investigate the possibility of these countries to become alternative gas 
suppliers to the EU through pipelines. There are three countries from the Caspian region 
(Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran), three countries from Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Libya) and 
three countries from the Middle-East& the Mediterranean regions (Iraq, Israel, Republic 
of Cyprus) will be analyzed. Besides, Turkey is included since the country is at the 
transaction between the counties in the Caspian, the Middle-East and the Mediterranean 












CHAPTER 2: ENERGY SECURITY OF THE EU: POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 








The 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises showed the EU that energy security of the 
Community needed to be strengthened. With the gas delivery disruptions, European 
countries remained without gas in the middle of the winter. As noted in the previous 
chapter, after the two crises, the European Union decided to take measures against gas 
disruptions to ensure the free flow of gas and to strengthen energy security of the 
Community. The EU decided to construct new pipelines to diversify its supply sources 
and routes. A significant decline in gas production led imports of the Union to increase 
each year. Since import dependency of the Community is growing, consolidating energy 
security by diversifying gas suppliers became one of the priorities for the Union. To this 
end, Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) was formulated by the EU to bring gas from the 
Caucasus, Middle-East and Mediterranean regions.   
The primary aim of this chapter is to analyze nine countries to determine whether they 
can serve as alternatives for Russian gas supplies for the European Union through 
pipelines. Three countries from Caspian Region (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran), three 
countries from North Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Libya) and four countries from the Eastern 
Mediterranean region (Iraq, Israel, Republic of Cyprus, and Turkey) will be analyzed. 
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Turkey is included since the country is at the center between Caspian, the Middle-East 
and Mediterranean regions and Europe.  
Among the selected countries, in the short term, Azerbaijan will supply gas to the EU 
with the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The 
country will make significant contributions to the energy security of both Turkey and the 
European Union. Azeri gas will be carried to Europe via Turkey, so Turkey becomes a 
critical strategic partner for the EU in the field of energy. With the help of Turkey, 
European countries can secure their energy supply independently Russian gas and 
pipelines. Additional to Azeri gas, this chapter argues that in the medium term and long 
term, Iraq has a potential to supply gas to Europe from SGC which will increase 
competition in the European market. Besides, Iran, Egypt, and Israel will be LNG 
suppliers to the European gas markets in the medium term and long term.  
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Turkmenistan is one of the essential countries in the Caspian region that can export gas 
to Europe. In 2016, the proven reserves of Turkmenistan were 17.5 trillion cubic meters 
(tcm), making the country with the fourth-largest gas reserves, even larger than that of 
the U.S. The country produced 66.8 bcm, and it consumed 29.5 bcm of gas in 2016.123 
Based on the new policies scenario of IEA, Turkmenistan will produce 86 bcm in 2025 
and 141 bcm of gas in 2040.124 
Even though Turkmenistan has a gas surplus and it can export significant volumes of gas 
to other countries, geographical constraints limit the potential of Turkmenistan. In 2016, 
the country only exported 29.4 bcm to China, 6.7 bcm to Iran and 1.1 bcm to 
Kazakhstan.125 From 2014 to 2016, Russia has gradually decreased its imports from 
Turkmenistan, and it totally ceased imports from the country in 2016. Iran also decreased 
its imports from Turkmenistan to increase domestic production. When Russia and Iran 
decreased their imports, Turkmenistan started to look for alternatives to export its gas.126 
As a result, the country shifted its export strategy to China, so more Turkmen gas started 
to flow to the Chinese market. Since Turkmenistan is a landlocked country, it cannot 
utilize from its potential of selling gas to other countries. For this reason, neighboring 
countries play a decisive role in shaping the export strategy of Turkmenistan. The country 
focused on selling its gas to China since it is not able to supply its gas to Turkey and then 
to Europe for several reasons.  
In 2015, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan established trilateral energy cooperation 
to strengthen their energy ties. With the cooperation, Turkmen gas was planned to connect 
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with the Southern Corridor system of Europe.127 The proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
(TCP) is designed to get connected with Southern Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and to carry 
30 bcm annually Turkmen gas to Europe.128 Even though Turkmen gas can be an 
alternative for Europe, the status of the Caspian is a formidable obstacle blocking the 
project. 
The recognition of Caspian as sea or lake is the primary source of the disagreement 
between five Caspian littoral states; namely Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and 
Kazakhstan. If the Caspian would be recognized as a lake, then five littoral states would 
need to share the wealth equally according to a “condominium” approach. If the Caspian 
would be recognized as a sea, then five littoral states could freely use the resources that 
are within their maritime borders.129 The absence of agreement on the status of the 
Caspian has prevented the construction of TCP because at least two of the littoral states, 
Russia and Iran, object to TCP, the former because such a pipeline can dilute its dominant 
position as the EU’s gas supplier, the latter because it can reduce Turkmenistan’s 
dependency on Iran. 
In order to bypass the Caspian problem, in 2010, ENI proposed compressed gas (CNG) 
project between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. With the project, significant volumes of 
high-pressure gas were designed to be transported to Azerbaijan by vessels and then it 
was planned to be transported to other destinations with the existing pipelines. At that 
time, Azerbaijan was reluctant for the realization of the project because the country did 
not want to compete with Turkmen gas.130 As a result, Turkmenistan is not able to supply 
its gas to Azerbaijan either via pipeline or via CNG.  
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Figure 7: Caspian Region Oil and Natural Gas Infrastructure131 
Other than the status of Caspian, the direct transfer of Turkmen gas to Europe through the 
Southern Gas Corridor can reduce the market share of Russian gas in Europe. The 
European gas demand was higher before the 2009 Ukrainian crisis. At that time, Russia 
profited from the gas sales by selling Turkmen gas to the EU countries at higher prices 
and paying Turkmenistan lower prices.132 After a while, Gazprom announced that it was 
willing to pay European prices to Turkmenistan which was around $360 per thousand 
cubic meters in order to increase its relations with post-Soviet energy-rich Caspian 
countries. Before this announcement, Russia had paid $150 per thousand cubic meters to 
the country. 133 
With the decline in oil prices, in which gas prices are indexed, and a decline in gas demand 
in Europe in 2009, Gazprom could not keep its promise to Turkmenistan that is paying 
European prices to the country and the company looked for alternatives to decrease 
imports from Turkmenistan to compensate its losses.134 In 2009, the Davletbat-Dariyalyk 
pipeline was exploded. Then, Gazprom asked Turkmenistan to reduce gas deliveries by 
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90%. After this incident, Turkmenistan continued gas deliveries to Russia but in lower 
levels.135 This shows that Gazprom was able to decrease its imports from Turkmenistan. 
In 2016, as noted above, Russia completely ceased its imports from Turkmenistan. 
Since Turkmenistan has been threatened by Russia which also stopped importing 
Turkmen gas, the country cannot export gas to EU through Russia. Besides, Turkmenistan 
has a strict pipeline policy that does not allow Turkmenistan to build external pipelines, 
so Turkmenistan will not build the proposed pipeline, TCP, on its own. In fact, there is 
no investment made by Azerbaijan and Turkey for the construction of the pipeline.136  
Another route for Turkmen gas to reach Europe is through Iran. Currently, Turkmen gas 
is carried to Turkey through Iran. However, the Iranian pipelines have low capacities due 
to infrastructural constraints.137 Moreover, the pipeline between Turkmenistan and Iran 
started its operations in 1997. Korpeje-Kordkuy pipeline has a capacity to transfer 13 bcm 
of natural gas per year.138 Also, the pipeline between Iran and Turkey, Tabriz-
Dogubayazit pipeline, has the capacity to transfer 14 bcm of gas per year. This 
demonstrates that infrastructural investments are needed in Iran to transfer Turkmen gas 
to Europe. In fact, Iran is interested in supplying its gas as LNG rather than pipelines 
since the country’s biggest gas reserves, South Pars Gas fields, are located in the southern 
part of the country. As a result, Turkmenistan cannot be an alternative for Europe firstly 
because of lack of agreed status of Caspian, secondly Russian threat and lastly 
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Azerbaijan is one of the countries that is strategically vital for the diversification plans of 
the EU. Azerbaijan has 1.1 tcm of proven natural gas reserves. In 2016, Azerbaijan 
produced 17.5 bcm, and it consumed 10.4 bcm of gas. According to the forecasts of the 
World Energy Outlook, gas production of Azerbaijan will be 37 bcm in 2025 and 55 bcm 
in 2040.139 
Azerbaijan has been producing its gas from Shah Deniz fields. Shah Deniz Stage 1 began 
its operations in 2006 with the capacity of producing 10 bcm of gas per year. With the 
completion of Shah Deniz Stage 2 in 2018-2019, the further 16 bcm capacity will be 
added over the production from Shah Deniz Stage 1, so the production capacity of 
Azerbaijan will rise to around 26 bcm of gas per year.140 Other than Shah Deniz fields, 
with the development of Umid, Babek, Nakhchivan, Apsheron, Zafer-Meshel, Araz-
Alov- Sharq, Asiman- Shafaq and Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli gas fields in the medium-term 
and the long-term, which have been estimated to total around 3 tcm, more Azeri gas will 
be able to flow to Europe, so that competition will increase in the European market. 
Besides, with the increase in gas supplies from Azerbaijan to Europe in the envisioned 
future, some volumes of Azeri gas can be diverted to Southeast Europe which will 
decrease import dependency of Southeast European countries on Russian gas and increase 
the energy security of these countries.  
One of the reasons why Azerbaijan will supply its gas to Italy rather than Southeast 
Europe stems from the fact that gas prices in Southeast Europe are around 10% lower 
compared to gas prices in Italy.141 Therefore, since supplying gas to Italy means more 
revenues to Azerbaijan, the country targets supply its gas to Italy.  
Since 2006, Azerbaijan has been supplying gas to Turkey with the South Caucasus 
Pipeline (SCP). With the completion of TANAP, TAP, and expansion of SCP projects, 
Azerbaijan will be able to export its gas to Europe through the territory of Turkey in the 
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short-run. Considering that the EU consumed around 463 bcm of gas in 2016142, 10 bcm 
of gas is a very low volume for the Union. However, 10 bcm of gas is significant for the 








According to the BP Statistical Review 2017, Iran has 33.5 tcm reserves of natural gas. 
In 2016, Iran produced 202.4 bcm while it consumed 200.8 bcm of gas.143 IEA predicts 
that gas production of Iran will be 243 bcm in 2025 and 338 bcm in 2040.144  
In 2016, Iran consumed what it produced, and a little amount remained for export which 
accounts for 1.6 bcm. Iran exported 7.7 bcm to Turkey. At the same time, Iran imported 
6.7 bcm from Turkmenistan and 0.2 bcm from Azerbaijan. In total, Iran imported 6.9 bcm 
while it exported 7.7 bcm.145 The remaining 0.8 bcm deficit in the export was supplied 
from domestic production. Based on the intergovernmental negotiations between Turkey 
and Iran, Iran is obliged to export 10 bcm gas to Turkey per year.146 Iran was able to 
export natural gas to Turkey with the help of Turkmen gas, and they could not supply the 
agreed amount of gas to Turkey since Iran’s domestic consumption was high. This shows 
that Iran lacks adequate gas for export to Europe.  
For more than ten years, there were international sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear 
activities. In 2016, Iran agreed to decrease its nuclear activities, and international 
sanctions were lifted. The deals enabled Iran to turn back into the international 
community.147 In 2017, Iran signed a deal with the French oil company Total to develop 
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South Pars gas fields in order to make production. It is estimated that the production will 
start in 2021.148  
The prospects of Iran for developing its natural gas resources further, however, are 
growing dimmer as a result of the Trump administration's repudiation of the nuclear 
accord and its intention to reimpose sanctions on Iran. the new U.S. administration may 
well drill, among the others, Iran's energy development projects.149 As of this writing, the 
French energy company Total has announced the termination of its involvement in South 
Pars project as a result of the U.S. sanctions that could affect its lucrative investments in 
the U.S. as well as joint ventures with the U.S. firms.150 
Even so, Iran plans to increase its production entailed to development its fields in the 
South across from the those of Qatar. These fields are far distant from the North to invest 
in new infrastructure to connect these resources to the Southern Gas Corridor. Therefore, 
there are infrastructural constraints that Iran needs to make investments to carry its gas 
from South to North in order to supply gas to the European corridor.151 
Moreover, there is little reason for Iran to make a considerable investment to carry its gas 
to the Northern part of the country. This is because Iran can easily export its gas in the 
form of LNG through Strait of Hormoz. In fact, the first target of the country will be 
supplying its gas to the profitable Asian markets given its geographical proximity. As a 
result, even if political constraints were resolved with Iran, the infrastructural constraints 
still remain with respect to pipeline exports from South Pars to Europe. For this reason, 
Iran cannot realistically be considered as an alternative gas supplier to the EU through 
gas pipelines. 
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Figure 8: Oil and Natural Gas Fields in Iran152 







The presence of international companies in Iraq helps the country to explore and produce 
natural gas. In 2016, Iraq had 3.7 tcm proven gas reserves.153 The country produced and 
consumed 7.04 bcm of gas in 2016.154 According to the projections of IEA, gas production 
in Iraq is estimated to increase from less than 10 bcm to around 90 bcm in 2035 with the 
development of the gas fields in the country.155 However, in the current situation, political 
instability inhibits investments, construction of storages and pipelines.156 Iraq is an 
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unstable country because of terrorism, poor governance and internal conflict between the 
Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).  
Turkey’s relations with the Iraqi government and KRG is one of the sources of divergence 
between the two governments. Until 2009, Turkey successfully increased trust and 
cooperation with the Iraqi government. Besides, Ankara attempted to build a common 
stance with the Iraqi government against PKK terrorism.157 However, after 2009, Turkey 
started to focus on its relations with the Kurdish regional government (KRG) and came 
to ignore Baghdad. This increased hostility between Turkey and the Iraqi government.158 
The relations between the Iraqi government and KRG was also problematic since the 
KRG began exporting oil to Turkey for the first time in 2009 without the consent of the 
central government. Besides, energy deals between Turkey and the KRG have been 
approved neither by the Turkish nor Iraqi Parliament which contradicts the legal basis of 
the energy trade between Turkey and KRG.159 
Different interpretations regarding the Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi constitution by 
the central Iraqi government and the regional government is one of the sources of discord. 
According to Article 111, “oil and gas are owned by all the people in Iraq in all the regions 
and governorates.”160 This article interpreted by KRG as Iraqi people who live in the 
regions or governorates own the resources within their region and governorates while 
central government interprets the article as resources in every region or governorate are 
owned by Iraqi people.161 Secondly, Article 112 states that: 
The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from 
present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in 
proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying 
an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were 
unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were 
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damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different 
areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law.162 
In the article, it is stated that federal and regional governments are responsible for the 
management of resources. However, there is uncertainty about how this is carried out. 
Besides, the terms “fair distribution” and “damaged regions” are open to interpretation. 
The absence of clarity in these articles leads to a difference in interpretation and leads to 
an increase in claims on a larger share on the revenues from different groups.163 
It is true that mineral resources are considered as national assets in most countries of the 
world, including Iraq. Accordingly, Baghdad’s claim to be compensated for all 
hydrocarbon exports is considered legitimate by international organizations. KRG, 
however, claims that it is not fairly compensated by the Iraqi government for payments 
for exports from its region. As a result, KRG prefers to export energy directly to Turkey 
and be compensated directly in return. The Iraqi government in return blames KRG for 
stealing resources of Iraqi people.164 
In the light of these disputes, political stability is one of the most critical components for 
attracting substantial investments. In the case of Iraq, political tensions between the Iraqi 
government and KRG raises the question of whether it is wiser to invest in Iraq or not. 
Even if investments would be made, there is uncertainty about the operation of the 
pipelines without interruption.  
The prospects of Iraq to supply its gas to Turkey and then to Europe depends on the 
settlement of the disputes between KRG and Iraq.165 In 2015, Genel Energy Chairman 
and the KRG Minister of Natural Resources declared that Iraq would deliver 10 bcm of 
gas to Turkey in 2020 and 20 bcm of gas could be supplied after 2020.166 In the short-
term, Iraq cannot be a reliable supplier to Europe, even if there has been a substantial 
investment made by Genel Energy with a view to exporting oil and gas from KRG to 
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Turkey and beyond.167 Major security issues need to be resolved which are the main 







With the discovery of Yam Tethys reserve, natural gas started to be used in Israel in 2004. 
The capacity of the reserve is around 30 bcm of gas. From 2004 to 2008, the reservoir 
was used for electricity generation in Israel. In 2008, The El-Arish-Ashlekon pipeline was 
built between Egypt and Israel. The pipeline is a branch of the Arab Gas pipeline, and it 
has the capacity to transfer 7 bcm of gas per year.168 Between 2008 and 2012, 60% of 
natural gas was domestically produced by Israel while 40% was imported from Egypt. In 
2012, the supplies from Egypt decreased significantly because of the Arab uprisings, 
damage to the pipelines and economic problems in Egypt. As a result, Israel built LNG 
facilities to import LNG.169 
In 2009, Tamar reserve was discovered. It has a capacity of 310 bcm of natural gas and 
the supplies from Tamar started to flow Israel in 2013.170 More than 90% of the gas 
demand of Israel was supplied from the Tamar field after 2013. In 2017, Israel consumed 
around 10 bcm of natural gas. 94% of gas was supplied through the Tamar field while 6% 
was supplied by LNG.171  
In 2010, Leviathan field was discovered, and it has a capacity of 621 bcm. It is expected 
to start its operations in 2020. In 2012-2013, Karish/Tanin fields were discovered, and 
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the capacities of these fields are 67 bcm. It is expected to start its operations in 2020.172 
With the discoveries, the total natural gas capacity of Israel is around 1 tcm. The country 
produced 9.04 bcm and consumed 9.39 bcm of gas in 2016.173 It is foreseen that gas 
production will rise to 23 bcm in 2025 and around 28 bcm in 2040. At the same time, gas 
consumption is expected to increase to 15 bcm in 2025 and to 25 bcm in 2040.174 
Therefore, there will be no significant volumes remain for export. 
The Israeli government has not decided whether to supply gas to European or Asian 
markets. If they decide to export to the European market, then pipelines need to be 
constructed. If Asian markets are targeted, then LNG infrastructures are required. In the 
European context, Israel has not many options. It can export gas together with the 
Republic of Cyprus as LNG, or it can build a pipeline to Greece via Cyprus or pipeline to 
Turkey.  
Figure 9: Export Options for the Eastern Mediterranean Gas175 
In 2012, Israel, Republic of Cyprus, and Greece signed a negotiation to set up eastern 
Mediterranean energy corridor. The corridor can be set up either through a joint Republic 
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of Cyprus-Israel LNG plant or a pipeline from Israel to Greece via Cyprus.176 The 
Republic of Cyprus was in favor of building LNG facilities which would have 7 bcm of 
gas capacity.177 However, the Greek Cypriot administration looked for Israeli financial 
support to cover the costs. Due to the hesitant Israeli attitude, financial support was not 
given to Nicosia government.178 In 2017, the Greek Cypriot project became eligible for 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), and the EU covered 60% of the costs of a feasibility 
study of the project. The CEF is a funding instrument of the EU, and it makes feasibility 
studies and investments in infrastructure. The main aim of the CEF is to link energy, 
transport and telecom areas of the EU by strengthening the infrastructure.179 The 
feasibility of the project will end in 2020.180 The decision to build LNG facilities will 
depend on the conclusion of this feasibility study.  
Another option for Israel is to construct a pipeline between Israel and Greece via Cyprus. 
The proposed Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline (EMP) would have the capacity to transfer 
12-16 bcm of gas. Although the pipeline has both financial and technical difficulties 
because of its undersea route, in 2017, three countries signed a memorandum for the 
construction of the pipeline by 2019. The parties set a target to 2025 for the completion 
of the project.181 However, the agreement does not guarantee the construction of the 
pipeline. Financing the pipeline is the most important aspect of the project, so there is a 
question mark regarding the construction of the pipeline.  
Besides, Israeli law prevents Israel to export gas below the domestic gas price. 
Considering that domestic gas price in Israel is $5.2/MMBtu and European countries pay 
around $4.8/MMBtu for imported gas, there is no commercial incentive for energy 
companies to make a costly investment to bring Israeli gas to Europe. On top of that, 
Israeli gas prices to Europe likely to remain high since Russia has the ability to make 
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price cuts.182 More elaborately, Russia wants to protect its share in the European Union 
market. Therefore, when the EU finds alternative routes to import gas, Russia can 
decrease its gas prices to keep its market share in the EU. Thus, since the Israeli gas will 
not be cheap because of the infrastructure costs, it can be argued that the Israeli gas cannot 
be able to compete with Russian gas.  
Moreover, in 2013, the Israeli government put a 40% limit on natural gas exports from 
the newly discovered gas reserves in order to supply more gas to the domestic market.183 
This means that Israel can export only 400-500 bcm. Therefore, with the export quota, it 
can be argued that significant volumes of gas cannot be transmitted to Europe. 
Furthermore, Israel- Turkey direct pipeline is more profitable than the joint LNG plant 
and the pipeline between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. The direct pipeline has a potential 
to supply over 10 bcm of gas to Turkey.184 With the realization of the new pipelines in 
Turkey, Israeli gas can be transported easily to Europe. However, one of the major 
problem in Israel- Turkey route is the maritime boundaries in the East Mediterranean. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was established in 1982 to 
define rules on the use of resources within maritime borders.185 Egypt, Lebanon, and the 
Republic of Cyprus signed the convention while Turkey, Israel, and Syria have not signed 
the convention. If claims on Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) clashes between the 
countries, they can be solved with bilateral negotiations. For instance, in 2010, Israel and 
the Republic of Cyprus signed an agreement to define their EEZ’s.186  
Israel planned to build a gas pipeline from its Leviathan field to the Southern part of 
Turkey. It was planned that the pipeline would be extended and attached to TANAP, so 
that Israeli gas would reach Europe through Turkey. However, the pipeline needs to pass 
from the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot administration is reluctant 
to permit such a project to cross from its EEZ because of its tense relations with Turkey. 
Alternatively, the pipeline can pass from the EEZ’s of Syria and Lebanon, but the hostile 
relations between Israel and these Arab states made pipeline less possible to cross from 
                                                          
182 Rzayeva, Gulmira. “Gas Supply Changes in Turkey.” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. January 2018: 12. 
Accessed March 09, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Gas-
Supply-Changes-in-Turkey-Insight-24.pdf  
183 "Israeli Government Approves 40 Pct Limit on Natural Gas Exports." Reuters. June 23, 2013. Accessed June 21, 
2018. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-natgas/israeli-government-approves-40-pct-limit-on-
natural-gas-exports-idUSL5N0EZ0BQ20130623  
184 Rzayeva, 12 
185 De Micco, 8 
186 De Micco, 10 
57 
 
that route.187 Moreover, Russia tries to protect its monopoly in the European market. 
Therefore, it can be said that Russian support on Nicosia government against Turkey 
prevents the construction of the pipeline. 
The regional export potential of Israel increased with the natural gas discoveries. If the 
feasibility study gives the green light to the joint LNG with the Republic of Cyprus, then 
two countries can export gas in the form of LNG to Europe after 2020. The pipeline 
between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece is the most expensive one among the available 
options. Besides, it has technical difficulties due to its long undersea route. However, in 
2017, the parties agreed on the construction of the EMP. If the construction of the pipeline 
will begin in 2019, then there is a possibility that the pipeline becomes operational in 
2025. Joint agreement for the construction of the pipeline does not guarantee that it will 
be built. Due to the high costs and difficulties, financial constraints are the main 
impediments of the project.  
All in all, if the EU wants to diversify its imports of natural gas, then the most cost-
efficient way is to import gas from Israel- Turkey pipeline. However, the dispute over the 
EEZ, the relations between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, and Russian influence in 
the region are the main obstacles for the construction of the pipeline. There are 
commercial and geopolitical constraints for Israel to export its gas to Europe through 
pipelines. Hence, it can be said that Israeli gas will be transported to the EU as LNG in 




2.2.3. Republic of Cyprus 
 
 
After the Israeli discoveries, Noble Energy and its partners found natural gas in 2011 in 
the Aphrodite field of Republic of Cyprus. The capacity of the field is around 120-129 
bcm. The energy mix of the Republic of Cyprus does not include natural gas. The field 
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was discovered in 2011, but it has not been developed yet.188 The reason for this is 
because a single platform will be used for two drillings. One for Leviathan and the other 
one for Aphrodite. With a single platform, costs will be lowered. As a result, the Cypriot 
reserve will become operational in 2020.189 Currently, the island of Cyprus does not have 
the natural gas infrastructure. The Republic of Cyprus prefers to build LNG facilities if 
and when the volumes available permit financing, and it wants to export its gas after the 
necessary developments.190  
Besides, in 2017, the Nicosia government started negotiations with Egypt to build a 
pipeline from the Aphrodite field to Egypt. With the negotiation, the Republic of Cyprus 
aims to export natural gas to Egypt, and the country will export Cypriot gas in the form 
of LNG to the Asian and European gas markets.191 However, building a pipeline to Egypt 
is more expensive than building LNG facilities in Cyprus.192 Other than exporting gas to 
Egypt, in 2017, Israel, Republic of Cyprus and Greece signed a memorandum for the 
construction of Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline (EMP) by 2019. The parties planned to 
finish construction of the project in 2025, and the capacity of the project will be around 
12-16 bcm of gas.193 However, it is not easy to finance such an expensive and challenging 
pipeline. As noted above, the Greek Cypriot administration also has a desire to export its 
gas as LNG. 
The continuing problem of Cyprus is that the island is politically divided. Turkish 
Cypriots argue that they have rights on natural resources of the entire island while Greek 
Cypriots argue that natural resources were found in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus 
and thus it could be utilized by the only Republic of Cyprus.194 Besides, Turkey has a 
reasonable argument that the Republic of Cyprus cannot make a unilateral decision for 
the development of the resources of the island.195 Although Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots have been negotiating for the reunification of the island since decades, the result 
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is a stalemate. Also, Turkey does not recognize the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Turkey blocked offshore drilling of Italian energy giant ENI by stating that the area is a 
part of the EEZ of Turkey.196  
Under these circumstances, political problems are likely to emerge between Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as between the Nicosia government and Turkey 
regarding the exportation of Cypriot gas. Considering that the EU consumed 463 bcm in 
2016, reserves of around 120 bcm of Cypriot gas is insignificant for Europe to make a 
costly investment. This shows Cypriot gas cannot be an alternative for Europe. 
Consequently, it can be argued that rather than exporting, Cypriot gas can be used by the 
two countries in the island, so that natural gas can decrease import dependency of these 
two countries to other fossil fuels such as oil. 
Figure 10: Natural Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean197 
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Egypt is one of the vital energy producers in the region. However, Arab Uprisings and 
political instabilities decreased production in Egypt. Due to the political situations in 
Egypt after the Arab Revolutions, it was unlikely for the Egyptian government to adopt 
provocative measures such as increasing energy prices.198 With the low energy prices, 
domestic demand has increased and caused 9.5 bcm deficit between production and 
consumption. The country produced 41.8 bcm while it consumed 51.3 bcm of gas in 
2016.199 IEA gas market report predicts that Egyptian gas production will be 69 bcm of 
gas in 2022 while gas demand will be 65 bcm of gas in the same year.200 
In 2015, the Italian energy company ENI discovered gas reserves in the Zohr region. The 
estimated capacity of the reserve is 850 bcm. Considering that the proven reserve of Egypt 
is 1.8 tcm, discovered reserves accounts for around 47% of the proven reserves of the 
country.201 The production in Zohr region started in December 2017, and it is expected to 
work in full capacity at the end of 2019.202 In June 2018, ENI announced that around 2.5 
tcm of gas was discovered in the Noor field which makes it the greatest gas field of Egypt. 
Drillings in the field are expected to start in the same year.203 The Zohr and Noor gas 
reserves will be used for increasing domestic needs as well as for export. Even though 
Egypt plans to export its discovered gas, in the current context, it is very hard to predict 
the export capacity of Egypt.  
Arab Gas Pipeline was designed to carry Egyptian gas to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Turkey. It was designed to carry around 10 bcm of gas per year.204 Until 2008, four phases 
were completed, and Egyptian gas reached Syria. Even though it was planned to extend 
the pipeline to Turkey and then to Europe, the outbreak of Arab Spring in 2010 and the 
Syrian civil war in 2011 prevented the construction of the pipeline.205 Besides, conflicts 
and sabotages in Egypt decreased Egyptian exports. If the pipeline were extended to 
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Turkey, Turkey would have received 10 bcm of natural gas per year. Until today, no 
progress has been made in the pipeline.206 
After the gas discoveries, Egypt started to perceive its role as an exporter country. Egypt 
has two LNG facilities and Egyptian state-owned company SUMED is now building new 
large LNG terminal on the Gulf of Suez which is expected to finish at the end of 2018.207 
The main reason why Egypt invested in LNG is that it wants to utilize from its 
geographical location. Egypt is at the center of the trade routes and thanks to the Suez 
Canal, Egypt can easily export its gas with LNG tankers. However, the potential of Egypt 
to export gas to Europe cannot be calculated given its rising domestic demand and the 
fact that domestic demand continues to rise. Consequently, since Arab Gas Pipeline could 
not be extended to Turkey and Europe, Egypt will supply its gas in the form of LNG in 




2.3.2. Algeria  
 
 
Algeria is an essential energy partner for the European Union. It had 4.5 tcm of natural 
gas reserves in 2016. In the same year, Algeria produced 91.3 bcm while it consumed 40 
bcm of gas. Algeria supplied 17.2 bcm to Italy, 11.8 bcm to Spain and 3.5 bcm to other 
European countries.208 In total, Algeria supplied 32.5 bcm of gas to Europe via pipelines. 
It also supplied around 10 bcm LNG to Europe.209 Although Algeria now exports its gas 
to different countries, some analysts even argue that it may evolve into a gas importer 
country on account of inefficiencies and inability to attract investments. Inefficient 
production, bureaucratic obstacles for the approval of new projects, the lack of investment 
and technical infrastructure are specifically cited.210 Due to its distinct and complex 
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taxation system as well as technical difficulties for the investment, Algeria is not able to 
attract foreign investment. Nevertheless, the World Energy Outlook 2017 foresees an 
increase in Algeria’s gas production.211 
The country used almost half of its gas for power generation. Gas is mostly used to 
generate electricity in Algeria, and the country produces around 90% of its electricity 
from natural gas.212 Low efficiency in the energy usage combined with weak 
infrastructure led gas demand to rise every year while overall exports have decreased in 
the recent years.213 As a result, Algeria, the third biggest gas supplier of the EU, has been 
struggling to increase the production. For this reason, it can be argued that Algeria can 








The proven gas reserve of Libya is 1.5 tcm.214 In 2016, Libya produced 11.36 bcm, 
consumed 6.53 bcm and exported 4.83 bcm of gas.215 Libya started to export gas in 2004 
to Italy with Greenstream Pipeline. The capacity of the pipeline is 8 bcm, but Libya 
supplied 4.4 bcm of gas in 2016.216 Libya also owns one LNG facility. The capacity of 
the LNG is 3.5 bcm. LNG exports of Libya have remained low because of infrastructural 
and technical constraints.217 After the civil war in 2011, production and exports of natural 
gas have recovered, but it is still low compared to the pre-war era. During the war, the 
only LNG plant of Libya was heavily damaged, and it could not be repaired. Therefore, 
the facility has been in operation since 2011.218 Neither political stability nor democracy 
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has been restored in Libya. Thus, it can be asserted that since Libya was unable to produce 








Turkey is an important country for the Community that can serve as a bridge between 
different regions and the EU in transfer gas to the EU. The proven natural gas reserve of 
Turkey is only, 5 bcm, an insignificant volume.219 As a result, Turkey is heavily 
dependent on imports of natural gas like the EU. After the two Ukrainian crises, energy 
security has become vital for the Community. To increase the energy security, Southern 
Gas Corridor (SGC) was developed by the Union in which Turkey will play a vital role 
in transmitting energy from different regions to Europe. By bringing gas to Europe, 
Turkey will also strengthen its energy security. 
It is argued in this chapter that Turkey can play a decisive role in decreasing the EU’s 
dependence on Russian gas. Development of the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), the 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Southern Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) demonstrate 
that Turkey can be an essential and strategic energy partner for the EU and it can play an 
essential role for the energy supply diversification efforts of the Community. When Azeri 
gas reaches Europe, competition between the gas suppliers will increase. Therefore, it can 
be said that on the one hand, the Union will ensure competition for affordable gas prices 
and on the other hand, the Community will able to decrease its high dependency on 
Russian gas. 
In this energy trade, Turkey either can be an energy transit or an energy hub. To 
understand the strategic importance of Turkey to the EU, a detailed analysis is required 
and will be made in the next chapter. In the analysis, Turkey’s energy structure, energy 
policy, pipelines that pass from its territory and the planned pipeline projects will be 
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considered. Then, Turkey’s possible role in the energy trade as an energy transit state or 
an energy hub will be analyzed. 





The conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 pushed the EU to take 
effective measures against gas disruptions from Russia. Therefore, SGC was formed to 
reach gas sources of the Caspian, the Middle-East, and the Mediterranean regions. In this 
chapter, nine different countries were analyzed which possibly supply natural gas to 
Europe via pipelines, and thus help the EU to diversify its gas imports. In this context, 
the emphasis was given to Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, 
Republic of Cyprus, Israel, and Iraq. Besides, Turkey was included since the country is 
at the intersection between the majority of these countries and Europe.  
Turkey is one of the strategically important countries that can serve as a bridge in 
transmitting gas from different regions to Europe. The EU and Turkey have overlapping 
interests in security of supply and diversification efforts. Both parties import gas mostly 
from Russia, try to diversify their energy composition and try to ensure the security of 
supply. These factors made Turkey and the EU natural strategic and inseparable partners 
in the field of energy. As a result, they can increase their energy security by strengthening 
their energy ties. 
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Forecasts of IEA demonstrates that gas production in the selected countries will increase 
up to 2040. However, not all these countries will be able to supply gas to Europe. 
Therefore, the chapter concludes that Azerbaijan will supply its gas to Europe in short-
term and Iraq has a potential to supply gas to Southern Gas corridor of Europe in the 
medium to long-term. Moreover, Iran, Egypt, and Israel are likely to provide LNG to the 
European gas market in the medium to long-term. On the contrary, Turkmenistan and the 
Republic of Cyprus will not be able to supply their gas to Europe, the former because of 
external factors and the latter because of both internal and external factors. Furthermore, 
due to the decline in their gas exports and rising gas consumption, the Union cannot 
increase its reliance on Algeria and Libya. 
The cheapest way to bring Azeri and Iraqi gas to Europe is to carry it via Turkey, so 
Turkey is strategically vital for the European Union. In the energy trade between the EU, 
Azerbaijan, and Iraq, Turkey either can be an energy transit or an energy hub. Detailed 
analysis will be made in the next chapter about Turkey’s possible role as being an energy 

































In the long history relations between the EU and Turkey, energy has played a significant 
role. Both Turkey and the EU are highly dependent on Russian gas, both have a desire to 
decrease the share of Russian gas and both aim to ensure the security of their energy 
supplies. These commonalities have made Turkey and the EU strategic and inseparable 
partners in the field of energy. Cooperation between these two parties can increase the 
energy security of both sides and it is believed that Turkey can be a potential game-
changer in the EU’s future gas security.221 With the realization of the new pipelines in 
Turkish territories, some analysts argue that Turkey can turn to a competitive gas hub in 
its region while the others do not agree with that. Therefore, the prospects of Turkey to 
become an energy hub is needed to be analyzed.    
In order to understand Turkey’s role in the energy security of the EU, it is worth 
mentioning Turkey’s energy structure, energy policy, pipelines that pass from through 
territory and planned pipeline projects. Well-planned and effective energy policy can 
decrease higher import dependencies. 
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Turkey’s energy policy prioritizes energy supply security, diversification of energy 
resources and changing the energy mix of Turkey by decreasing the share of natural 
gas.222 Currently, Turkey has four gas pipelines, and there are six planned gas projects. 
Among these projects, two pipeline projects are under construction in the Turkish 
territory (Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Turkish Stream) and two other pipeline 
projects will be connected to pipelines in the Turkish territory (South Caucasus Pipeline 
(SCP) and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)). The remaining two pipelines are now idled. 
These pipelines will enable Turkey to play an essential role in its region. 
In energy trade between Europe and Turkey, Turkey can be either an energy transit state 
or an energy hub in its region when the gas transmission is considered. The country has 
a desire to evolve into a physical energy hub in its region.223 By becoming an energy hub, 
Turkey would define the terms and conditions for the transfer of energy to Europe.  
In the first section, the energy structure of Turkey will be presented. In the second section, 
the energy policy of Turkey will be explained. In the third section, current pipelines and 
planned pipeline projects will be described. In the fourth section, the role of Turkey in 
the energy security of the European Union and the obstacles for Turkey to become an 
energy hub will be discussed.  
This chapter argues that in order for Turkey to become a physical energy hub, it needs to 
deal with four critical obstacles. The first obstacle is the price of gas in its long-term gas 
agreements. The second one is the “take or pay” clause in the long-term gas agreements 
and the third obstacle is natural gas storage capacity. Finally, and the most significant 
obstacle is, as analyzed in the previous chapter, the amount of gas available in its 
immediate neighborhood for Turkey to ensure the flow of significant volumes to Europe. 
If Turkey can successfully tackle the obstacles mentioned above, the probability of 
Turkey becoming a physical energy hub will increase in the near future provided that new 
sources from the region will become available. Rather than being a physical hub, a virtual 
hub is more feasible to Turkey. However, the country has a desire to become a physical 
energy hub. With these obstacles, Turkey cannot go further than being an energy transit 
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country. Therefore, as a transit country, Turkey will have a limited ability to affect energy 
dynamics in its region. 
The amount of energy Turkey is capable of importing represents only as a small fraction 
of gas. Turkey imports via pipelines for domestic consumption or for transit. Its LNG 
imports, therefore, will not be considered in the context of Turkey as an energy transit 








There is a strong relationship between economic growth and energy demand, so Turkey’s 
energy demand has been following the upward trend because of its growing economy. 
Energy demand increases not only because of the economic growth but also increases 
when population increases. Therefore, there is also a strong relationship between 
population and energy demand. 
Table 7: Population, Economy and Energy Demand224 
Table 7 shows the relationship between population, economy and energy demand. 
According to this table, from 1990 to 2000, the population increased by around 11 million 
people, GNP per capita increased by $635, and total energy demand increased by 28.9 
Million tonnes oil equivalent (Mtoe). From 2000 to 2010, the population increased by 
around 11 million people, GNP per capita increased by $2057, and total energy demand 
                                                          




increased by 71.3 Mtoe. From 2010 to 2020, the population is expected to increase by 9 
million people, and GNP per capita by $3895, and total energy demand by 128.3 Mtoe.  
This shows that economic and population growth has increased energy demand of 
Turkey. When economies of countries grow, the demand for energy increases to bolster 
economic growth. Other than economic growth, the demand for energy increases when 
more and more people are able to afford middle-class lifestyles including modern 
dwellings and appliances. As a result, economic Turkey energy demand is expected to 
increase to sustain economic growth and to respond to demands coming from various 
segments of Turkish society. Another reason why Turkey needs more energy is that the 
considerable gap between energy production and demand. Unable to satisfy its energy 
demand from domestic sources, Turkey relies on energy imports, which represent 99% 
of its gas consumption and 90% of its oil consumption. 
Table 8: Energy Production, Imports, and Tpes225 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicators, in 1990, energy 
production of Turkey was 25.8 Million tonnes oil equivalent (Mtoe). In 2000, energy 
production increased very little to 25.9 Mtoe. In the following decade, energy production 
was 32.4 Mtoe. Finally, in 2016 Turkey’s energy production was 33.7 Mtoe. This shows 
that energy production in Turkey increased 30,6% from 1990 to 2016. Considering its 
economic growth and population, energy production has remained insufficient. Turkey 
needs more energy to satisfy its energy demand. According to the table, in 1990, net 
imports were 28.1 Mtoe. In 2000, imports increased to 50.9 Mtoe. This year coincides 
with an economic boom for Turkey. Then, in 2010, imports increased to 75.1 Mtoe. 
Finally, in 2016, net imports reached 105.8 Mtoe. Energy import of Turkey increased 
276.5% from 1990 to 2016.  
Compared to a 30.6% increase in energy production, energy imports of Turkey have 
increased drastically. Turkey’s energy production in 2015 was 31.7 Mtoe. Among the 
domestic production, fossil fuels, chiefly coal, account for 51.1% while renewable energy 
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accounts for 48.9%.226 This shows that renewable energy has an essential place in 
Turkey’s domestic energy production. However, the share of renewables has a small place 
in Turkey’s overall energy mix. The share of renewables in the energy mix of Turkey was 
12.1% while the share of fossil fuels was 87.9% in 2015.227 Turkey’s energy demand is 
vital to understand the energy dynamics of the country. 
Figure 11: Tpes 1973-2015228 
IEA report indicates total primary energy supply (TPES) of Turkey. As shown in Table 
8, TPES of Turkey in 2015 was 128.8 Mtoe. Among the TPES, “Fossil fuels totaled 113.6 
Mtoe in 2015, an increase of 53.2% from 74.2 Mtoe in 2005… Over the past decade, 
natural gas and coal supply increased by 72.1% and 56.2%, respectively, while oil supply 
increased by 35.8% during that period.”229 This shows that in ten years, the share of fossil 
fuels increased dramatically. According to Figure 11, in the energy mix of Turkey, the 
highest share was taken by oil. Natural gas and coal took the second and the third place 
respectively after oil. Even though oil has the highest share in the energy composition of 
Turkey, the highest increase occurred in natural gas with 72.1%, and coal followed it with 
56.2% and with oil 35.8% covering the years between 2005-2015. The reason why the 
highest increase occurred in natural gas is that Turkey used 55% of its imported natural 
gas for power production.230 Power production from natural gas is the most expensive 
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way of generating electricity while there are less expensive other options available for 
Turkey, such as renewables or nuclear.231 
Total Final Consumption (TFC) of Turkey amounted to 93.5 Mtoe in 2015.232 Among 
TFC, the highest energy consuming sector is an industry with 26.1 Mtoe. The 
transportation sector is the second biggest energy-consuming sector that consumed 24.3 
Mtoe in 2015. The housing sector followed the transportation sector by consuming 20.1 
Mtoe in the same year. Finally, the Service sector used 12.1 Mtoe. The remaining 10.9 
Mtoe was used in other sectors of the Turkish economy.233 TFC is essential to point out 
which sectors consume the most significant amount of energy in Turkey. 
According to the 2016 IEA report, Turkey imported 25.1 Mtoe of crude oil in 2015, which 
represented 90.6% of its consumption. Oil from Iraq represented 45.5%, from Iran 22.3%, 
from Russia 12.4%, from Saudi Arabia 9.5% of the imports while smaller quantities were 
imported from other countries.234 This indicates that Turkey imported its oil mainly from 
the Middle-East and Turkey is highly dependent on imports of oil.  
Secondly, Turkey has indigenous coal production, so that the country uses the majority 
of its domestic coal for power production. In 2015, the country produced 12,8 Mtoe of 
coal which accounts for 37% of the consumption.235 The remaining 63% was imported 
from Colombia, Russia, South Africa, Australia and other countries.236 
In 2015, Turkey imported 99% of the natural gas it consumed which amounted to 48.2 
bcm of gas. Russia accounted for 55.1% of its gas imports, Iran 16.2%, Azerbaijan 12.3%, 
Algeria 8.1% and small amounts from Nigeria.237 In 2016, Turkey imported around 5% 
less natural gas which added up to 46.3 bcm. The share of Russia in Turkey’s imports 
decreased to 52.9% while there was an increase in the share of imports from other 
countries such as Iran (16.6%), Azerbaijan (13.9%), and Algeria (9.2%).238  
Among the imported fossil fuels, the dependency of natural gas is the highest one with 
99%. As a consequence, with imports representing 90.6% of oil, and 99% of natural gas 
consumption, Turkey’s high energy dependency to creates vulnerability to external 
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pressures. This situation requires that Turkey find a way to decrease its high dependency 
on imports. As a result, the importance for Turkey to attract greater volumes of gas 








Turkey’s energy policy is shaped mainly by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
(MENR) which has the sole authority in the formation and implementation of the energy 
policies and programs. The ministry’s primary responsibilities include the drafting of the 
strategic plans for energy. This means that the Ministry sets a variety of goals and 
objectives to be met in a projected timeline. The strategic plan covers four years. 
Currently, the 2015-2019 strategic plan is being implemented.239  
In the drafting of Turkey’s energy strategies, the Ministry identified seven fundamental 
values and principles and formulated the key pillars of Turkish energy policy in line with 
these values and principles. They are; Transparency (It is about the accessibility of 
activities with relevant parties and the public.), Reliability (The activities are carried out 
with the purpose of trust in national and international platforms.), Environmentally 
consciousness and respect to life (The activities are carried out in accordance with the 
protection of the environment and respect to human life.), Participation (To give 
importance to stakeholder’s opinions, suggestions, and expectations and to include 
stakeholders in the policy-making process.), Innovativeness and leadership (To support 
innovation and the use of new technologies.), Efficiency (To give importance 
productivity and efficiency by using public resources.), Consistency and predictability 
(To carry out stable activities as well as taking care of national benefits with medium and 
long-term planning.)240  
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The Ministry has built its strategic plans on these seven critical fundamental values and 
principles. These values and principles are essential to understand how the Ministry 
operates and perceives the world of energy. The Ministry set 8 themes, 16 goals and 62 
objectives which are defined in very detailed fashion. All themes and goals are shown in 
Table 9: 
Table 9: Themes and Goals of the 2015-2019 Strategic Plan241 
Since Turkey is close to major energy producing and energy consuming countries, it 
wants to utilize its geographic location for the energy trade. Therefore, Turkey has the 
ambition to become an energy hub in its region. In the inauguration ceremony of TANAP, 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that “Our country is now one step closer to its vision 
to become a hub of energy lines thanks to TANAP.”242 The new pipelines have 
reawakened Turkey’s ambition to evolve into an energy hub.243 
Apart from the Strategic Plan of MENR, key objectives for energy policy is identified in 
10th National Development Plan (2014-2018). The development plan includes strategic 
sectoral objectives which enable the government to make wiser investments, and it serves 
as a guideline for the government and ministries.244 In the national development plan, 
strategic objectives for the field of energy are defined, and these objectives overlap with 
the goals of MENR. Overall, the primary objectives of Turkish energy policy which are 
defined in the Strategic Plan of MENR and 10th National Development Plan are the 
following: 
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Table 10: The Main Objectives of Turkish Energy Policy245 




 In the first section (Energy Structure of Turkey), it is shown that Turkey has 99% import 
dependency on natural gas and it imports its natural gas mostly from Russia, Iran, and 
Azerbaijan. Gas coming from these countries are transmitted through pipelines to Turkey. 
This creates a dependency on the exporter countries. For this reason, the priority is given 
to energy security, decreasing the share of natural gas in the energy mix and 
diversification of resources in Strategic Plan of MENR and 10th National Development 
Plan of Turkey. In this part, first current pipelines and then planned pipeline projects will 
be presented.  
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Figure 12: Natural Gas Pipeline System in Turkey246 
3.3.1. Current Pipelines 
 
 
Currently, Turkey has four natural gas pipelines in which supplies come from Russia, 
Iran, and Azerbaijan and it has one interconnector with Greece. The first pipeline was 
built in 1986, and the last pipeline was built in 2007. With these pipelines, Turkey is able 




3.3.1.1. Trans-Balkan Pipeline 
 
 
With the intergovernmental agreement signed between the Soviet Union and Turkey in 
1986, the first pipeline of Turkey was constructed between the Soviet Union and Turkey. 
The pipeline has the capacity to transfer 14 bcm of gas per year and the agreement 
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between two countries signed for 25 years.247 The pipeline starts in Russia and passes 
from Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. The length of the pipeline is over 
1000km. The total capacity of this pipeline is around 14 bcm of gas per year.248 As noted 
earlier, Russia announced that it would stop supplying gas via Ukraine by 2019, and thus 
it developed new and alternative routes to supply gas to Turkey and Europe.249 For Turkey 
and Southeastern Europe, the Turkish Stream and for Europe Nord Stream 2 pipelines are 
being built. After 2019, Russia aims to connect Turkish stream to the Trans- Balkan 
pipeline, and the latter will be reversed, so that Russia will continue to supply gas to 




3.3.1.2. Tabriz- Dogubayazıt Pipeline 
 
 
The pipeline enables natural gas flow from Iran to Turkey. The pipeline started its 
operations in 2001, and it has the capacity to transfer around 14 bcm of gas per year. The 
length of the pipeline is around 2500 km.251 Based on the negotiations between two 
countries, Iran is obliged to supply 10 bcm gas to Turkey.252 In Erzurum, the pipeline 
connects with the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), and then it extends from Doğubeyazıt 
to Ankara via Erzurum.253  
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3.3.1.3. Blue Stream 
 
 
In 2003, a new pipeline was built between Russia and Turkey. In this pipeline, there are 
no transit countries which means that there is a direct natural gas connection between 
Russia and Turkey. The annual capacity of the pipeline is around 16 bcm, and the length 
of the pipeline is around 1200 km.254 The pipeline has the highest capacity among the 
existing pipelines in Turkey. Besides, Trans- Balkan pipeline and Blue Stream enable 
Russia not only to export more significant volumes of gas to Turkey but also to keeps its 
dominant position in the Turkish market. After the completion of Turkish Stream, Russian 




3.3.1.4. South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) 
 
 
The pipeline was commissioned in 2006, and it started deliveries in the next year. The 
pipeline starts from Azerbaijan, passes through Georgia and reaches to Turkey. The 
capacity of the pipeline is around 7 bcm of gas per year. The length of the pipeline is 
around 700km.255 This pipeline has been essential for Turkey to break Russian 
dominance. However, the capacity of the pipeline is low compared to Russian pipelines. 
After the capacity expansion, Azerbaijan will able to supply more gas to Turkey, so that 
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3.3.1.5. Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) 
 
 
In 2007, the representatives of Turkey, Greece, and Italy signed the new pipeline project 
that interconnects natural gas systems of these countries. The EU gave particular attention 
to the pipeline and supported its construction.256 The project starts in Turkey, passes 
through Greece and reaches Italy. The capacity of the interconnector is around 11.3 bcm. 
The length of the ITGI is around 300 km.257 Turkey- Greece interconnector started its 
operations in 2007, but there is little progress has been made on the Greece and Italy 
leg.258  The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is now being built to connect gas 




3.3.2. Planned Pipeline Projects 
 
 
Planned pipeline projects are designed for securing Turkey’s energy supply, and they will 
serve to diversify its energy suppliers. Also, these new projects will enhance Turkey’s 
role and influence in the region. There are six planned projects. Among them, two pipeline 
projects are under construction in the Turkish territory (TANAP and Turkish Stream) and 
two other pipeline projects will be connected to pipelines in the Turkish territory (SCP 
and TAP). The remaining two pipelines are now idled. The four significant projects will 
finish in 2020. With the new projects, Turkey will increase the share of Azeri and Russian 
gas in its domestic consumption. Besides, Turkey will able to transmit greater volumes 
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3.3.2.1. South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) (expansion) 
 
 
South Caucasus pipeline started its operation in 2007 starting from Azerbaijan and 
reaches to Turkey through Georgia. Currently, the pipeline is being expanded, and it will 
finish in 2018-2019. With the expansion, the pipeline capacity will be increased to over 
20 bcm per year.259 Currently, SCP has around 7 bcm capacity. The expansion is needed 
to supply gas to both Turkish and European markets. Therefore, Azerbaijan will able to 
supply around 12 bcm of gas to Turkey and 10 bcm of gas to Europe. With the expansion, 
Azeri gas will compete with Russian gas in both markets. Also, it will contribute to the 




3.3.2.2. Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) 
 
 
The construction of TANAP started in 2015, and it finished in June 2018. It has 16 bcm 
capacity to carry natural gas per year. 6 bcm of gas will be delivered to Turkey, and the 
remaining 10 bcm will be delivered to Europe. The capacity of the pipeline is planned to 
increase to 24 bcm and then to 31 bcm with additional investments.260 The length of the 
pipeline is around 1900km. The pipeline starts in Azerbaijan, passes through Georgia and 
reaches Turkey.261 First, Azeri gas will be carried to Turkey with expanded South 
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), and it will be linked to TANAP project in Turkey. Then, the 
TANAP project will be linked to another project called Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).262 
This means that the TANAP project is an intermediary between SCP and TAP. TANAP 
is the cornerstone for the energy security of the EU as well as of Turkey. The shareholders 
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of the project are SOCAR (58%), BOTAŞ (30%) and BP (12%).263 This means that 




3.3.2.3. Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) 
 
 
The construction of the TAP project started in 2016. The operations of the pipeline are 
expected to start in 2020. The capacity of the pipeline is around 10 bcm, but it can be 
expanded to over 20 bcm with additional investments.264 The length of the pipeline is 
around 880km. The pipeline will start in Greece, passing through Albania and reach 
Italy.265 This project will be the extension of TANAP and SCP, carrying Azeri gas to 




3.3.2.4. Turkish Stream 
 
 
In 2014, Russia replaced South Stream project with Turkish stream project. The new 
project starts in Russia and ends in Turkey.266 With this project, Turkey will transmit 
Russian gas to the EU. The pipeline has a length of 900km, and the construction of the 
pipeline started in 2017, and it will finish in late 2019. The construction is carried out by 
South Stream Transport BV which is owned by Gazprom.267 Therefore, the pipeline will 
be owned by Gazprom and Turkey is isolated from the construction of the pipeline. The 
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implication of this exclusion is that, unlike TANAP, Turkey will not be able to control 
the gas that will be traded from its territory. The capacity of the two strings of the pipeline 
that is under construction will be 32,5 bcm of gas annually.268 The political aspect of the 
pipeline is that Russia will protect its dominant share in the European market and it will 
undermine the diversification efforts of the EU. Besides, Russia will remain the greatest 




3.3.2.5. Iraq-Turkey Pipeline 
 
 
Turkey has been working on transmitting Iraqi gas to Turkey. Even though negotiations 
were made between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), Iraqi government and 
Turkey, no agreement was reached. The pipeline is designed to carry 10 bcm to 20 bcm 
of natural gas per year.269 Besides the stalemate in negotiations, terrorism, conflict, and 
instability in Iraq pose major obstacles to the construction of the pipeline. One of the aims 
of Turkey is to build a new pipeline between Iraq and Turkey and to connect that pipeline 
to TANAP.270 However, the project has come to standstill although Iraq has the potential 




3.3.2.6. Arab Gas Pipeline 
 
 
The project is one of the significant natural gas projects that includes five countries. The 
pipeline designed to carry Egyptian gas to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. It was 
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designed to carry around 10 bcm of gas per year.271 The first phase was completed in 
2003 between Egypt and Jordan. The pipeline starts in Arish in Egypt to Aqaba in Jordan. 
The second phase completed in 2007 and it was the extension of the first phase. The 
pipeline was extended to Aqaba port to El Rehab in Jordan. The third phase completed in 
2008 and the pipeline was extended to El Rehab in Jordan to the Jordan-Syria borders. 
The fourth phase completed in 2008 and the pipeline again extended to Jordan-Syria 
borders to Homs. In 2009, another extension was built between Syria and Lebanon.272 
Even though it was planned to extend the pipeline to Turkey and then to Europe, the 
outbreak of Arab Uprisings in 2010 and the Syrian civil war in 2011 prevented the 
construction of the pipeline.273 Besides, conflicts and sabotages in Egypt decreased 
Egyptian exports. If the pipeline were extended to Turkey, Turkey would have received 
10 bcm of gas per year. No further work on the pipeline extension has been made since 








Turkey, considering its geographical location, is at the center of energy trade of multiple 
regions namely the Middle-East, Mediterranean, Caucasus, and Europe. Standing at the 
intersection between energy producing countries and energy consuming countries raises 
the question of whether Turkey can contribute to the energy security of the European 
Union. In the Eurasia nexus, Turkey can be potentially an energy transit state or an energy 
hub. Each of these concepts attributes a different meaning to Turkey’s role in the field of 
energy.  
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An energy transit state refers to a state where the energy pipelines are laid to 
connect an energy-producing state with an energy-consuming state. 
Agreements are made between the energy producer and the transit state by 
which the latter collects transit revenues for allowing hydrocarbons to be 
transported across its territory.275  
By being an energy transit state, Turkey’s role would be limited since the country just 
receive transit fees from exporter countries, and it would not be able to re-export energy 
sources that pass from its territories.  
An energy hub is a country that buys energy in its borders and then re-exports 
them to other purchasers. In doing so, it sets the selling conditions 
(theoretically) independently from the original producers and final buyers. An 
energy hub requires a more sophisticated physical and virtual environment 
for the producers and consumers to meet and interact using the facilities 
provided by the host country. It is also essential to have a well-developed 
financial and legal environment for the trade to take place in a safe and secure 
environment.276 
By becoming an energy hub, Turkey would be able to define the terms and conditions of 
transfer of energy as well as able to re-export energy sources. Becoming an energy hub 
requires not only sufficient storage capacity for energy in the host country, but it also 
requires a sophisticated environment in which buyers and sellers get together, so that 
Turkey would facilitate trade between energy producing and consuming countries. It is 
stated in the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) that 
Turkey has the vision to become an energy hub in its region. As an energy hub, Turkey 
would get both economic and political benefits. Compared to becoming an energy transit 
country, Turkey would earn more money by becoming an energy hub since it would be 
able to define independent selling conditions for energy. Besides, Turkey’s political 
bargaining would increase as an energy hub since it would facilitate trade between energy 
producing and consuming countries and it would be able to set its terms and conditions 
in energy trade. 
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A hub can be a physical or virtual. The physical hub is a physical intersection of the 
pipelines and gas is traded according to point to point basis and only agreed the amount 
of gas is traded. On the contrary, the virtual hub serves as a trading platform for multiple 
participants and gas is traded regardless of point of extraction and different quantities can 
be traded.277 Therefore, physical hubs are implemented in the specific locations while 
virtual hubs are implemented in trans-regional zones. Besides, gas trade is more flexible 
in virtual hubs.278 In Turkey’s case, the country is more suitable for being a virtual hub 
than a physical hub. 
Even though Turkey aspires to evolve into a physical energy hub, the European Union’s 
perception is quite different. After the two Ukrainian crises in which the EU witnessed 
gas disruptions, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) was developed by the EU. In this 
project, the EU perceived Turkey as an energy transit country rather than a hub.279   
SGC is designed to improve the energy infrastructure of Southeast European countries by 
bringing gas from the Caucasus, Middle-East and Mediterranean regions.280 The main 
aims of SGC are to break the European dependency on Russia with the diversification of 
gas routes and to secure the European energy supply. The gas corridor will start its 
operations until 2020. In the beginning, around 10 bcm of gas per year will be flown to 
Europe via Turkey with TANAP. In the future, the EU aims to increase the capacity to 
80-100 bcm of gas per year.281 SCG has the potential to supply 20% of Europe’s gas 
needs.282 For this reason, SGC is at the heart of energy security of the Community. In 
SCG, the emphasis was put on Turkey’s role as a transit country. Other than the EU’s 
vision of Turkey as a transit country, four obstacles prevent Turkey from becoming an 
energy hub. These obstacles are the price of natural gas, “take or pay” clauses, gas storage 
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The main natural gas exporters to Turkey are Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. Turkey’s lack 
of bargaining power caused gas contracts to be in favor of energy exporter countries. 
Consequently, Turkey has paid higher prices compared to European countries and it is 
not allowed to re-export gas due to the restriction of gas sales in the “take or pay” clause 
in the contracts. Therefore, one of the fundamental obstacles for Turkey to become an 
energy hub is the non-flexible conditions in the gas contracts. Price and “take or pay” 
clause in the contracts inhibit Turkey to become an energy hub. Other than contractual 
terms, another critical obstacle for Turkey is its low gas storage capacity. Moreover, the 
most important obstacle for Turkey is the inability of neighboring countries to supply 




3.5.1. Price of Natural Gas 
 
 
Natural gas import price is a determinant factor for Turkey to export gas to other countries 
in the region. Lower gas prices increase the possibility of Turkey becoming an energy 
hub since Turkey would make a profit by re-exporting the gas.  
Turkey’s lack of bargaining power caused natural gas prices to remain high to Turkey. 
Although Russia made around 10% discount for the gas price in 2015, the price of gas is 
still high.283 Figure 13 shows the natural gas price for Turkey. In the 3rd quarter of 2017, 
Turkey paid around 210$ million cubic meters (mcm) to Russian gas. Compared to the 
same quarter of the previous year, natural gas prices rose significantly. Since those gas 
prices are indexed to oil prices, rising gas prices can be attributed to “the rise in oil prices 
                                                          





caused by lower stock levels, a stronger demand outlook and continued OPEC and non-
OPEC production cuts.”284  
In February 2016, the oil price was $34 per barrel. At the end of 2017, oil price rose to 
around $60 per barrel.285 Therefore, Turkey’s energy bills increased. In 2016, the country 
paid around $27 billion for energy imports while it paid around $37 billion in 2017.286 
Another reason for the increase in energy bills is that the increase in gas consumption in 
the country. On top of that, Gazprom wants to increase its revenues to fill the gap between 
its revenues and expenditures, so Russia increased gas prices to Turkey.287  
In 2016, Turkey made complaints to the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) by 
claiming that Iran charged higher prices for its gas compared to other gas producers in 
the region between 2012 and 2016. The court ruled in favor of Turkey. The decision 
directed Iran to either pay $1.9 billion to Turkey or to make a 10-15% discount on future 
gas prices.288 Iranians chose to make a discount on the gas prices. As a result, gas prices 
for Turkey decreased in 2016. However, in 2017, the gas prices rose again. As shown in 
Figure 13, in the 3rd quarter of 2017, Turkey paid above 200$/mcm for Iranian gas. The 
increase in gas prices stems from fluctuations in gas demand and changing oil prices. 
Thanks to ethnic, cultural and historical ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan 
is the only gas exporter country which charges lower prices and does not have price 
conflicts with Turkey289 In the first quarter of 2016, Azeri gas was cheaper compared to 
Russian and Iranian gas. However, the gas prices of Azerbaijan rose in line with an 
increase in oil prices, to which gas prices are linked.290 In the 3rd quarter of 2017, Turkey 
paid slightly above 200$/mcm, which is similar to the price paid to Iranian gas.  
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Figure 13: Natural Gas Price for Turkey291 
Thus overall, gas exporting countries charged higher prices to Turkey. Turkey paid over 
200$/mcm for Russian, Iranian and Azeri gas. At the same time, in the first quarter of 
2016, Russia charged 180$/mcm on average to its European customers.292 This means 
that Turkey spent a greater amount of money for the imported natural gas compared to 
European countries. Becoming an energy hub would provide an opportunity for re-
exportation of the gas. However, in the current context, Turkey has paid more than 
Europeans, so it is not possible for Turkey to re-export gas. Therefore, it is not possible 
for Turkey to become a competitive hub. For this reason, Turkey needs to be able to attract 
lower-priced natural gas. Because of its close geographical proximity to energy producing 
countries compared to European states, Turkey is theoretically capable of accessing 




3.5.2. “Take or Pay” Clause 
 
 
Take or pay clauses are generally included in long-term natural gas contracts. With this 
clause, the customer either pays the price of natural gas agreed upon between buyer and 
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seller regardless of whether it is delivered or not or takes agreed upon quantities of natural 
gas.293 The reason for this is because once natural gas is extracted, the seller country needs 
to ensure that buyers will take the extracted amount. Otherwise, natural gas is wasted. 
Turkey is subject to several “Take or Pay” clauses. In the Trans- Balkan Pipeline, Turkey 
needs to take at least 80% of an agreed amount of gas with a make-up period for five 
years. In the Blue Stream, the country needs to take at least 80% of gas, and there are 25 
years for the make-up period which is more beneficial for Turkey. In the South Caucasus 
pipeline, Turkey needs to take at least 75% of an agreed amount of gas with a make-up 
period for four years. In the Tabriz- Dogubayazıt pipeline, Turkey needs to take at least 
80% of an agreed amount of gas with a make-up period for five years.294 Make-up periods 
are an integral part of “take or pay” clauses that enable buyers to make-up gas that has 
paid but not taken. Long make-up periods give flexibility to the gas importing countries. 
The problem with “take or pay” clauses is that generally, these agreements are combined 
with restriction of resales of the gas. As a result, importer country cannot re-export gas to 
other countries.295 Natural gas consumption peaks in winter and it is minimum in summer. 
This is called seasonal demand fluctuations.296 In this situation, since Turkey lacks 
sufficient gas storage capacity, it has difficulties in balancing high gas supply with low 
demand in summer and the country is not able to re-export gas because of the restrictions 
in the gas contract. Therefore, the country paid the price of the agreed upon amount of 
natural gas without delivery. Besides, shorter make-up periods raise difficulties for 
Turkey to receive gas that is paid for gas exporting countries. Being an energy hub 
requires the right of re-exportation of gas with no “take or pay” clause. This means that 
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3.5.3. Natural Gas Storage Capacity 
 
 
Natural gas storage is essential to balance seasonal demand fluctuations. Besides, gas 
storages increase the energy security of the countries since countries can use the deposited 
gas in the case of gas disruptions. In the Strategic Plan, it is stated that Turkey aims to 
increase natural gas storage capacity to a level in which 10% of annual gas consumption 
can be supplied from these capacities.297 Currently, as seen in Table 11, Turkey has four 
operational natural gas storages in which two of them are Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
storages. The natural gas capacity of Turkey is 3.84 bcm and LNG capacity is 0.32 bcm. 
The total natural gas capacity of Turkey is 4.16 bcm. Considering that Turkey consumed 
46.3 bcm in 2016, the total natural gas capacity accounts for around 8% of its natural gas 
consumption.  
The storage capacities of some European countries in 2016 were Germany (23,9 bcm), 
Italy (17,2 bcm), the Netherlands (14,3 bcm), France (11,7 bcm) and Austria (8,4 bcm).298 
In the same year, the total gas storage capacity of the EU is around 120 bcm which 
accounts for around 22% of total gas demand.299 It is evident that Turkey’s gas storage 
capacity is low compared to European countries. Turkey needs more capacity than its 
current target of 10%. Capacity building in natural gas is necessary to become an energy 
hub, to deal with seasonal demand fluctuations and to strengthen energy security of the 
country. Turkey has been working on increasing its storage capacity, and it is likely for 
Turkey to reach its aim of building 10% capacity in the near future. With the completion 
of the Tuz Gölü project, total underground storage capacity will increase to 9.24 bcm. 
The MENR also plans to build new gas storages in different places in Turkey in the 
future.300 Until the completion of these infrastructures, it is hard for Turkey to become an 
energy hub. 
 
                                                          
297 Strategic Plan 2015-2019”, 25  
298 Cornot-Gandolphe, Sylvie. “Underground Gas Storage in the World – 2017 Status” Cedigaz Insights. July 2017:7. 
Accessed June 19, 2018. Retrieved from 
http://www.cedigaz.org/documents/2017/Overview%20of%20underground%20gas%20storage%20in%20the%20wor
ld%202017%20v1.pdf  
299 "Gas Storage Map." Gas Infrastructure Europe. December 2016. Accessed April 23, 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.gie.eu/index.php/maps-data/gse-storage-map  




Table 11: Natural Gas Storage Capacity of Turkey301 
3.5.4. Availability of Gas 
 
 
Turkey has geographical proximity to the biggest proven gas reserves. However, as noted 
in Chapter 2, except Azerbaijan, the Caspian, the Mediterranean, and the Middle-Eastern 
countries cannot supply gas to Turkey and Europe in the short-run via pipelines either 
because of internal or external factors. Availability of gas is a prerequisite to becoming a 
physical energy hub. In the concept of physical energy hub, natural gas from different 
countries are gathered in the hub country through pipelines and the country which is a 
hub re-exports the gas that was imported from different countries. Since there are no 
significant additional volumes of gas coming from the immediate neighborhood of 
Turkey, it is hard for Turkey to become a physical energy hub. With the realization of the 
new gas projects, import capacity of Turkey will rise to around 100 bcm of gas. However, 
the country will only transfer 16 bcm of Russian gas and 10 bcm of Azeri gas to Europe. 
In fact, as noted above, Turkey has low or no shares in the new pipelines that are under 
construction in its territory (TANAP and Turkish Stream). Consequently, distant from 
being a physical energy hub, Turkey will have even limited capabilities as a transit 





                                                          









Turkey has essential and long-lasting relations with the EU. Standing at the intersection 
between energy producer and consumer countries raises the possibility of whether Turkey 
can contribute to the energy security of the EU. At this point, it is essential to know about 
Turkey’s energy structure, energy policy, pipelines that pass from its territory and the 
planned pipeline projects in order to understand whether it can contribute to the energy 
security of the EU or not. Turkey is dependent on imports of fossil fuels over 90%. A 
high dependency on foreign countries in the energy sector creates vulnerability to external 
pressures. This can be decreased with a well-planned and feasible energy policy.  
The energy policy of Turkey prioritizes to energy security, diversification of energy 
resources and changing the energy mix of Turkey with decreasing the share of natural 
gas. Currently, Turkey has four pipelines, and there are four pipelines are still building. 
These pipelines will enable Turkey to play an active role in its region.  
In the Eurasia nexus, Turkey can be an energy transit or an energy hub. By becoming an 
energy transit state, Turkey would receive transit fees from energy-exporting countries. 
This means that energy importing and exporting countries would agree with each other. 
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By becoming an energy hub, Turkey would be able to define the terms and conditions for 
the transfer of energy. However, it needs to provide sufficient gas storage capacity and 
sophisticated environment that buyers and sellers can meet, so that energy trade would be 
facilitated between energy producing and consuming countries. 
Becoming a physical energy hub is essential for Turkey because it would have both 
economic and political benefits to Turkey. It has economic benefits since Turkey would 
set the price and terms of carrying energy to the European Union. It has political benefits 
since the political bargaining power of Turkey would increase. This stems from the fact 
that the country would facilitate trade between energy producing and consuming 
countries and it would be able to set its selling terms and conditions of energy. 
This chapter argues that in order for Turkey to become a physical energy hub, it needs to 
meet with four critical challenges. These are the price of the gas in the long-term gas 
agreements, “take or pay” clauses, low natural gas storage capacity and availability of 
gas. If Turkey is able to tackle these issues successfully, the probability of Turkey to 
become a central energy hub in the near future will increase. Other than tackling these 
issues, Turkey needs to provide sophisticated physical and virtual environment as well as 
well-developed financial and legal environment if it wants to become an energy hub. The 
virtual hub is more practical for Turkey to facilitate trade between the energy producing 
and consuming countries. However, Turkey has a desire to evolve into a physical energy 
hub than a virtual hub. As long as the above-mentioned obstacles remain, Turkey cannot 
go further than being an energy transit country. As a transit country, it will also have 
limited capabilities since it has low or no shares in the new pipelines that transport Azeri 
and Russian gas to Europe. 
In the next chapter, the diversification efforts of the European Union will be analyzed. 
Even though Turkey is away from being a physical energy hub, it can still contribute to 














CHAPTER 4:  ENERGY SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH THE 








Natural gas is the second most demanded commodity for the European Union after crude 
oil. The future projections of the International Energy Agency (IEA) demonstrate that the 
world will use more natural gas than before. Both production and consumption are 
expected to increase in the coming decades. In the European context, IEA predicts that 
natural gas demand of the EU will fall around 2% while natural gas production will fall 
around 40% until 2040.303 The decline in consumption can be attributed to an increase in 
efficiency and renewable energy as a result of 2020, 2030 and 2050 Strategies of the 
Union. The decline in production can be attributed to lack of natural resources. In this 
situation, the EU will import more natural gas to fill the gap between production and 
consumption. 
Russia is the biggest natural gas supplier to the EU with the share of 43% in 2017. IEA 
foresees that gas production and exports of Russia will increase up to 2040. Increase in 
export capacity means that Russia will continue to supply a vast amount of gas to 
Europe.304 After two Ukrainian crises, the EU started to reconsider its dependency on 
Russia, and it has aimed to diversify its suppliers and sources to ensure the security of 
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energy supply. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is one of the sources that can lower the gas 
import dependency of the Community on Russia and it can contribute to the energy 
security of the EU. Even though the EU had import capacity of 210 bcm, it imported only 
43 bcm of gas as LNG in 2017.305 This is because Russia lowered its gas prices to compete 
with LNG from other sources, thus keeping its market share. 
Besides LNG, shale gas also has the potential to increase the security of supply of the 
Union.  With the shale revolution, the export capacity of the U.S. is growing significantly. 
This has increased competition among the exporter countries. The price of U.S. gas will 
be decisive for the European customers. When all costs are added, it is predicted by IEA 
that Russian pipeline gas will be cheaper compared to the U.S. shale gas in 2025.306 
Consequently, it can be said that Russia will keep its share in the European market at 
around 40% in the future.  
Another source that can contribute to the energy security of the Union is renewable 
energy. Currently, the share of renewables is around 17%, and the share will increase by 
carrying out 2020, 2030 and 2050 Strategies. In 2016, 11 out of 28-member states reached 
the target of increasing the share of renewables by 20%.307 Since increasing the share of 
renewables is a long-term target, the transformation of the energy mix of the European 
countries will take time. 
Even though Russia will continue to supply tremendous volumes of gas to Europe in the 
future, developments in LNG, renewables and shale gas compel Russia to lower its gas 
prices. Before these developments, Russia applied higher prices to European countries. 
The EU and Russia have interdependence in the field of energy. The EU needs Russian 
gas to maintain its domestic consumption, and Russia needs revenues to feed its 
economy.308 Although the EU started to reconsider its dependency on Russian gas after 
the two Ukrainian crises, the construction of Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream pipelines 
demonstrates that the share of Russian gas in the EU market will remain at the same 
levels.  
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These two pipelines consolidate Russian domination in the EU market and create 
fragmentation inside the Union. The construction of Nord Stream 2 is a clear indication 
of how national interests dominate the decisions of member states. Southeast European 
and Baltic countries are against the pipeline because they believe that the pipeline 
jeopardizes the energy security of the Union while Germany is in favor of the construction 
of Nord Stream 2 because it believes that Germany needs gas for its domestic 
consumption and Russian gas can decrease gas prices in Germany.309 To bypass Ukraine, 
Russia developed the Turkish Stream to bring its gas to Europe while Southeast European 
countries are concerned about the pipeline and their continuing dependency on Russian 
gas.310  
As noted before, Western European countries consume greater gas volumes compared to 
Southeast European countries. Therefore, 10 bcm of Azeri gas is not a significant volume 
for Western European countries considering their gas demand while the same volume of 
gas makes a serious difference in Southeast Europe. 
Considering that five Southeast European countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) imported 21,1 bcm of gas, consumed 22,6 bcm and Russian 
supplied 15,8 bcm to these countries in 2016, Russian share in these countries’ gas 
imports were more than 70%. Therefore, if Azerbaijan will increase its gas production 
and it will supply more gas to Europe, there is a chance that the country will supply its 
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Natural gas is one of the essential energy resources for the Union. Future projections in 
natural gas are essential to predict and future trends in the natural gas markets. The New 
Policies Scenario includes both current energy policies of countries and the evaluation of 
possible outcomes from the implementation of announced new policies.311 It is developed 
by International Energy Agency (IEA), and it provides a realistic scenario for the future 
gas trends. 
Table 12: Natural Gas Demand by Region in the New Policies Scenario (Bcm)312 
It can be inferred from Table 12 that natural gas demand will rise throughout the world 
in 2040 compared to 2016 levels. One of the reasons for the rise in gas demand stems 
from the fact that natural gas is the cleanest type of fossil fuel, so it burns cleanly and 
efficiently. Besides, natural gas prices are competitive. Moreover, those European 
countries which have closed their nuclear power plants began relying more on natural gas 
and renewables. Therefore, their demand for gas increased. Even though natural gas can 
be substituted by renewable energy, renewables require backup plant for power 
production.313 In this case, natural gas can be used to back up renewables. For this reason, 
natural gas will not lose its importance, and it will be used in the future.  
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The table shows that the EU consumed 463 bcm of gas in 2016. In 2040, the demand of 
the Union is expected to fall to 454 bcm. The fall of the European demand can be 
attributed to 2020, 2030 and 2050 Strategies and the EU’s aim of increasing energy 
efficiency. By increasing efficiency, the Union plans to decrease its energy imports. 
Table 13: Natural Gas Production by Region in the New Policies Scenario (Bcm)314 
Table 13 shows the natural gas production by regions. It can be understood from the table 
that global natural gas production will rise by around 40% from 2016 to 2040. The gas 
production of the EU will decline significantly until 2040. In the given time interval, 
production of the EU will show a declining trend, and it is expected to fall around 43%. 
This is because Europe is not an energy-rich continent.  
Compared to the expected fall in gas demand in the EU which is around 2%, the 
production will fall much more significantly up to 2040. Gas production in Norway, 
which is the second biggest gas supplier to the EU, has been decreasing. On the contrary, 
gas production in other regions such as North America, the Middle East, Eurasia 
especially Russia, are expected to rise significantly.  
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Table 14: Natural Gas Trade by Region in the New Policies Scenario315 
In 2016, the European Union was the biggest importer of natural gas in the world by 
importing 329 bcm of gas while Russia was the biggest exporter by exporting 188 bcm 
of gas. From 2016 to 2040, the imports of the EU are expected to increase based on the 
New Policies Scenario. In 2016, the share of natural gas imports was 71%. The share is 
anticipated to increase to 80% in 2025 and then to 84% in 2040 because there will be a 
sharp decline in gas production in the EU while demand will fall to minimal amounts. 
Increase in import share means becoming more and more dependent on foreign countries. 
Therefore, the issue of the energy security will become more significant given the 
Community's rising gas import dependency. Since Russian exports will grow from 2016 








                                                          







Up to 2040, the EU will need more and more gas for its domestic consumption and Russia 
will produce more and more amounts of gas for export. Therefore, it can be said that 
Russia aims to remain as the leading supplier to Europe in the future. In 2017, the EU 
imported 360 bcm of gas mainly from Russia (43%), Norway (34%), Algeria+ Libya 
(11%) and the remaining gas (12%) was imported in the form of LNG.316 As stated in the 
previous chapters, after the two Ukrainian crises, the European Union has shifted its 
attention to the security of supply and diversification processes. To decrease the share of 
Russian gas and to increase competition, the EU has increased its LNG imports.  
LNG has several benefits, and the share of the LNG is growing in the world markets. 
LNG is flexible compared to pipelines because it can be shipped to any part of the world. 
This means that it can play an essential role in the diversification efforts of countries and 
it provides energy security for countries since it eliminates pipeline dependencies. In 
2012, around 340 LNG ships were in operation. Four years later the number of vessels 
increased to 460. The total capacity of the vessels were around 70 million cubic meters. 
Until 2025, more than 120 vessels are expected to be delivered.317 Therefore, the share of 
LNG trade will grow throughout the world and in Europe in the coming decades, so LNG 
has transformed the gas industry. The costs of transportation and storage of LNG have 
decreased, so LNG becomes competitive against pipeline transportation.318 Besides, LNG 
prices decreased thanks to an increase in global supply and fall in oil prices.319  
In the EU in 2016, 65% of the gas is traded according to gas-to-gas competition, mostly 
in Western Europe, while 35% of the gas traded based on oil-indexation, mostly in 
Southern Europe. In the world LNG trade, oil indexation is the dominant pricing method. 
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Up to 2040, it is foreseen by IEA that both in pipeline and LNG trades, gas-to-gas 
competition will prevail.320  
Oil indexation is used in gas trades to predict revenues and to make investments in gas 
projects by energy producing countries. However, the gas industry has been evolving.321 
Therefore, in the competitive gas markets, gas needs to compete with gas in various 
sources rather than being subject to oil prices in order to react properly to changes in gas 
supply and demand. In fact, the European gas market is moving away from oil indexation 
method to gas-to-gas competition method. 
In 2017, the EU imported around 43 bcm of gas in the form of LNG. LNG carried to 
Europe mainly from Qatar (41%), Nigeria (19%), Algeria (17%), Peru (7%), Norway 
(7%), the U.S. (4%), and Trinidad and Tobago (3%). Compared to previous years, LNG 
imports of the Union has been increasing.322 Up to 2040, IEA predicts that the Union will 
import around 80 bcm of gas as LNG. Therefore, the share of LNG in the European 
market will rise from 12% to around 20%.323 
Figure 15: Regasification Capacity of the European Union324 
In 2017, the EU had 210 bcm of regasification capacity, and it rose only by 1 bcm in 
2018. With the new plans, there will be additional constructions in the regasification 
capacities, so the new capacity of the European Union will be 214 bcm in 2026.  In other 
words, in the coming nine years, the operational capacity will rise only by 4 bcm.  
Even though the EU has a capacity of 210 bcm for LNG imports, as noted above, the 
Community imported around 43 bcm of gas. The main reason why the EU imported a 
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small amount of LNG while they had more capacity is due to the price of LNG. LNG and 
pipeline gas have competitive prices, and they traded to the EU around $4.8/MMBtu in 
2016.325 Russia is selling its gas at spot prices, so that it can compete with LNG from 
other sources. Besides, Russia offered flexibility in its contracts with European 
customers.326 Consequently, Western European countries prefer to buy Russian gas in 
greater volumes rather than LNG from other sources because Russia can respond quickly 
to demand fluctuations in Europe because of its supply capacity and geographical 
proximity to Europe.  
Moreover, on December 8, 2017, the first LNG cargo shipped from Yamal peninsula 
which means that Russia is becoming an important player in LNG trade. Since 2009, the 
country has two LNG facilities in Sakhalin, but these facilities provide gas to the Asian 
markets. With the LNG facility in Yamal, the main target of the country is the European 
market.327 Therefore, Russia keeps up with changing gas trade patterns in the world as 
well as in Europe. 
Currently, 11 out of 28 EU members have a total of 24 LNG facilities. Spain has seven 
facilities, France has four facilities, the UK and Italy 3 facilities, Belgium, Greece, 
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal have one facility.328 Thus, as it can 
be seen, Southeast European countries, except Greece, do not have access to LNG. 
Therefore, they are vulnerable to gas disruptions due to their higher import dependencies 
on Russian gas. The EU is trying to consolidate gas accessibility of each country in the 
Union including LNG by supporting infrastructure development projects through PCI.329 
Among the projects, LNG projects in Greece and Croatia will enable these countries to 
bring gas to Southeast European countries. The main impediment of Southeast countries 
to reach LNG is that they are landlocked countries and they do not have robust and 
connected gas infrastructures to bring LNG from Greece.  
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Greece has already one LNG terminal. The Greek government decided on the 
construction of a new LNG terminal in Alexandroupolis. The estimated capacity of the 
LNG facility will be around 6 bcm. The project was included in the lists of PCI by the 
Union.330 The facility will be in service in late 2020. The importance of the facility is that 
it is designed to work together with the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and an 
interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria.331 At present, Greece has 5 bcm capacity in 
Revithoussa LNG terminal.332 With the completion of new LNG facility, LNG import 
capacity of Greece will rise to around 11 bcm. As stated before, Southeast European 
countries do not have access to LNG, with the completion of interconnectors between the 
member states and LNG facilities in Greece and Croatia, Southeast European countries 
will have access to LNG. 
Croatia does not have an LNG terminal. The country decided to build LNG facility in Krk 
Island. The project has two phases.333 In the first phase, the floating storage and 
regasification unit (FSRU) will be built. In the second phase, a land-based LNG import 
facility will be built. The facility will start its operations in 2020, and it will have 2.6 bcm 
of gas capacity.334 The project was included in the lists of PCIs.335 After the completion 
of Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) in 2019 and the interconnectors between the member 
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Shale is a rock formation that contains a vast amount of gas which is trapped inside the 
rock.336 Shale gas is a type of unconventional gas, so it requires special techniques, tools, 
and capital to extract the resource inside the rock. With the technological advances, 
extraction of shale gas has become cost competitive.337 The shale revolution started in the 
United States, and it has spread throughout the world. The importance of the shale 
revolution is that it changed the world gas market dynamics.  
First of all, the most significant benefit of shale gas for the U.S. is that as a result of an 
increase in significant shale production in the U.S., imports of the U.S. have decreased 
drastically. Shale revolution not only decreased imports of the U.S. but it also enabled the 
U.S. to evolve into a gas exporter country. According to natural gas production by New 
Policies Scenario (Table 13), gas production of the U.S. will rise around 42% between 
2016 and 2040. As a result, shale will make the United States both self-sufficient and a 
gas exporter country.  
Secondly, the shale revolution inspired other countries. For example, China, Canada, and 
some Latin American countries have started to consider producing and exporting shale 
gas.338 With the increase in shale production, gas trade is moving from pipeline to LNG.  
Thirdly, with the shale revolution, gas availability in the world gas market has increased. 
This led to a decrease in gas prices, and it also increased competition between the exporter 
countries. Thus, it can be stated that the possibility of the U.S. gas to be used in Europe 
strengthened the hands of the European Union against Russia because the U.S. LNG can 
decrease dependency of the Union on Russia.  
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Shale can break the dominance of Russia in the EU’s gas market but the decisive factor 
for the Europeans is the price of the U.S. gas. Last year, Trump administration called 
European countries to buy the U.S. gas. However, currently, the U.S. LNG remains more 
expensive than Russian pipeline gas.339 Moreover, when all costs are included, the price 
of the U.S. LNG will be around 9$/MMBtu to European customers while Russian gas 
will cost around 6$/MMBtu in 2025. This means that the U.S. LNG will not be 
competitive compared to Russian pipeline gas. 
Figure 16: Delivered Cost of Different Sources of Gas to Europe and Asia in 2025340  
It is predicted by the IEA that to keep gas prices at a sustainable level, Russia will 
accommodate a small amount of the U.S. LNG to the European market. Until 2030, the 
share of the U.S. LNG is anticipated to reach around 12% in Europe which is 4% in 2017, 
but then the U.S. exports to Europe are expected to fall since the U.S. will export more 
gas to profitable Asian markets.341 As stated before, the most significant benefit of the 
U.S. LNG to Europe is that it had increased competition and compelled Russia to lower 
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Renewables also have a potential for reducing dependency on Russian energy. From 2004 
to 2016, the share of renewable energy rose from around 8.5% to around 17%.342 The 
share of renewables has increased steadily, and this growth attributes to the 2020 Strategy 
of the Union. Among the renewables, the most used sources in the European Union are 
biofuels (49.4%), hydropower (14.3%), wind power (12.4%) and solar power (6.3%).343  
In 2016, the Union consumed 179 Mtoe of renewables. Based on the New Policies 
Scenario, the EU will consume 232 Mtoe in 2025 and 305 Mtoe in 2040.344 In fact, the 
European Union put targets to increase the share of renewables with the 2020,2030 and 
2050 Strategies. These strategies are long-term targets of the Union, and renewable 








The EU and Russia have interdependence in the field of energy. The EU needs Russian 
gas to maintain its domestic consumption, and Russia needs revenues to feed its economy. 
Figure 16 demonstrates the share of oil and gas revenues in the federal budget of Russia. 
In 2016, the share of Russian oil and gas revenues were 36% of the federal budget. 
Compared to previous years, the share of energy revenues in the federal budget shows a 
declining trend. 
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Figure 17: Oil Vs Gas: Shares of Russia’s Federal Budget345  
The rising trend in natural gas revenues, especially after 2010, can be explained by the 
Russian energy export strategy. To protect its market share in the EU and to compete with 
LNG from other sources, Russia lowered its gas prices. Even though gas revenues 
remained low compared to revenues from oil, the market share of Russia rose to 43% in 
the EU thanks to lower gas prices. This stems from the fact that Russia was able to sell 
its gas at lower prices.  
Russia has two options for determining the price of its gas. In the first option, Russia can 
lower gas prices which leads to growth in Russian market share in the EU, but there will 
be less revenue for Russia. In the second option, Russia can raise gas prices which leads 
to a decline in the Russian market share of the EU, but there will be more revenues for 
Russia. Among these options, Russia chose the first option because it does not want to 
lose its strategic superiority in the field of energy against the EU and it wants to remain 
as a competitive supplier. Natural gas production in the EU is declining while imports of 
gas are rising. In this context, Russia wants to remain a strategic partner in supplying gas 
to the EU. Geopolitics of energy is central to Russian politics and economy. 
When Putin came to power in 2000, one of his first aims was to keep energy sector under 
state control. As a result, Russian energy companies were nationalized, and liberal 
policies were put away. After that moment, Russia started to use energy as a tool of its 
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foreign policy.346 Russian energy companies sign long-term contracts with European 
energy companies to transfer energy to Europe. The problem for the EU is that Russian 
energy companies are state-led companies, so they act along with the Russian foreign 
strategy. In contrast, the EU energy companies are private companies, and they consider 
commercial interests.347  
With three energy packages, the EU liberalized its energy market. In the context of free 
and fair competition, it is easy for Russian energy companies to integrate into the EU 
energy market. For instance, Russia co-owns and co-operates the gas pipelines, it makes 
investments in gas transmission systems and infrastructures in Europe. Other than that, 
Russia holds shares in gas storage facilitates throughout Europe. The reason why Russia 
did all these is to control the transfer of gas to the EU.348  
Inside the Union, European countries have different levels of gas demand and they hold 
their right to select their gas suppliers. Since natural gas is traded to the EU at the national 
level, Russia applied different prices to different European countries based on the depth 
of its relationship with these countries. As shown in the figure below, in 2013, Belarus 
paid under $200 per thousand cubic meters, and it is the only country in Europe that paid 
such a low price. Germany, Austria, Hungary, Finland, Moldova paid around $323-$400 
per thousand cubic meters; Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey paid around 
$400-$475 per thousand cubic meters and Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Bulgaria, and Greece paid the highest price that is over $475 per thousand cubic 
meters for Russian gas.  
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Figure 18: Russian Gas Prices to European Countries in 2013349 
It can be inferred that Russia rewarded countries which have close ties with it by applying 
low prices like Belarus and it punished countries which do not have close relations with 
it by applying high prices like Poland, Ukraine, and the others. This situation creates 
problems within the EU because Russia has applied different prices to the member states. 
Therefore, for the same gas, some European countries pay lower prices while some 
European countries pay higher prices. Consequently, it can be asserted that the country 
abused its dominant position in the European market by overcharging some member 
states. With the developments in LNG and Shale Gas, Russia had to lower its gas prices 
across the board.  
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Table 15: Average Gas Selling Prices to Europe350 
In 2012, Russian gas prices were around $385 per thousand cubic meters, and it gradually 
decreased to around $350 per thousand cubic meters in two years. After 2014, Russian 
gas prices sharply decreased until 2016. The main reason for this significant decline in 
gas prices is because natural gas prices are indexed to oil prices. Therefore, the decline in 
oil prices led to the decline in natural gas prices. 
Moreover, the EU increased its LNG imports, and it has invested more in renewables and 
infrastructure development projects. In order to protect its market share in the EU and to 
compete with LNG, Russia lowered its gas prices significantly. In 2016, Russia sold its 
gas around $176 per thousand cubic meters. This shows that oil-indexed natural gas prices 
pulled down Russian gas prices. Besides, the shale revolution and LNG increased 
competitiveness throughout the world, so these developments also contributed to a fall in 
gas prices. As a result, Russia was not able to charge higher prices to its European 
customers like in the previous years.    
Russia and the EU have long-lasting energy trade, and they are tightly bonded to each 
other, so it is not easy for the EU to sever its energy ties with Russia. Although the EU 
started to reconsider its dependency on Russian gas, the construction of Nord Stream 2 
and Turk Stream pipelines demonstrates that Russian share in the EU market can remain 
at the same levels. In 2017, Ukraine was the main route in transferring Russian gas to 
Europe. With the expiration of transit contract between Russia and Ukraine in 2019, Nord 
Stream 2 and Turk Stream pipelines will take the place of the Ukraine transit pipelines, 
so that Russia can bypass Ukraine in the transfer of energy to Europe.351 This shows that 
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supply routes are being changed. Even though Ukraine Transit pipelines (includes the 
Trans-Balkan pipeline and Brotherhood pipeline) have around 115 bcm of gas carrying 
capacity, the pipelines do not operate at full capacity due to infrastructural constraints. 
Figure 19: Russian Pipeline Gas Export Capacity to Europe352 
It is expected that Russian exports to the European Union will increase in the coming 
decades. To maintain gas trade, sufficient gas infrastructure and capacity is needed. The 
total capacity of Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream is roughly around 70 bcm. In this 
context, there will be possible physical constraints for Russia to supply its cheap gas to 
Europe if the capacity problem is not resolved in the near future. Especially after 2020, 
Russian exports will increase substantially, so additional infrastructures and capacities 




4.5.1. Nord Stream 2 
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The construction of Nord Stream 2 pipeline demonstrates, as noted, that national interests 
dominate the community interests and it fueled fragmentation inside the Union. Among 
the member states, countries which are hostile to Russia such as Poland and the Baltics 
(Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland and Sweden) and countries which are transit 
countries such as Hungary and Slovakia were against the construction of the pipeline. The 
governments of the eight countries voiced their concerns and stated that the pipeline has 
a potential to harm the European energy security.354 Other than these countries, Southeast 
European countries have a cogent argument that Germany’s support on the pipeline not 
only jeopardizes the energy security of Southeast European countries, but it also 
undermines the development of internal energy system inside the Union.355 
Germany is the strongest and biggest country inside the European Union, and it is in favor 
of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Germany wants to become a hub for 
Russian gas, so that Germany can supply gas to other European countries such as France, 
the Czech Republic, and Poland. Considering that gas production in Norway and the 
Netherlands have been declining, Germany has a desire to increase its imports from 
Russia to satisfy its domestic gas demand. Moreover, German officials stated that the 
pipeline can lower gas prices in Germany, so the pipeline is good for Germany.356  
Germany and Russia have long-lasting relations, and Russia has supplied gas to Germany 
without any interruption even during the Cold-War, so it is unlikely for Russia to reduce 
gas flow to Germany.  If Russia would reduce or cut gas supplies to Germany, it could 
lose its market dominance in the European Union since Germany is the leading power of 
the European Union. Economic and political power of Germany made it the de facto 
leader of the European Union. This is because the country played an essential role in the 
Eurozone crisis by giving funds to member states and it played an essential role in the 
migrant crisis by accommodating migrants to resolve the crisis.357 After the success in 
dealing with the two crises, Germany emerged as a leader of the European Union. It is 
known that Russia wants to protect its market share in the EU, so gas disruption to 
Germany is least likely.  
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From the Russian perspective, Gazprom claims that Nord Stream 2 pipeline will end 
transit uncertainties and compared to Ukraine transit pipelines, the new route will be 
cheaper and shorter. Since the new pipeline is directly between Russia and Germany, it 
eliminates transit fees that Russia has given to transit countries.358 This demonstrates that 
Russian arguments are based on economic interests, but the pipeline created tensions and 
divided the Union. Southeast European and Baltic countries, as well as Poland, are against 
while Germany is in favor of the construction of Nord Stream 2. For many years, the EU 
has worked for completion of its internal market and speaking as one voice. However, 
national interests always dominated the community interests in the field of energy. 
Consequently, it can be said that Nord Stream 2 pipeline will enable Russia to protect its 




4.5.2. Turkish Stream 
 
 
As noted before, Russia announced that it would not supply gas over Ukraine by 2019, 
so it developed new and alternative routes to supply its gas to Europe. Turkish stream is 
the new pipeline that will carry Russian gas. The pipeline will carry 16 bcm of gas to 
Europe while TANAP will carry 10 bcm. Therefore, more Russian gas will be supplied 
to Europe in this corridor. With the Turkish stream, Russia will kill multiple birds with 
one stone. This means that Russia will be able to protect its market share in the European 
Union, it will continue to earn revenues from energy export, so that its economy will not 
be damaged, and it will keep its sphere of influence in the countries that are highly 
dependent on itself especially in Southeast Europe.359  
It is known that Russia tries to protect its market share in the EU. One of the tools of 
Russia to protect its dominance is Turkish Stream. The project will contribute to the 
consolidation of Russian stance in Southeast Europe. Currently, Russia supplies gas to 
Turkey together with the Blue Stream and Trans-Balkan pipeline. The latter starts in 
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Russia and passes from Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. The capacity of the 
pipeline is around 14 bcm. After the realization of the Turkish Stream, the pipeline will 
be connected to the Turkish Stream, and it will be reversed with interconnector between 
Bulgaria and Turkey. Therefore, Russian continue to supply its gas to Southeast European 
countries.  
Moreover, the interconnector between Bulgaria and Turkey is expected to be in service 
in July 2018. In the initial plans of the Turkish Stream, it was envisaged that Russian gas 
would reach the EU over Greece.360 The country had a desire to connect Turkish Stream 
to TAP to supply its gas to Europe. However, this option is not possible because TAP has 
10 bcm capacity and Azerbaijan will supply that amount of gas, so there will be no enough 
capacity for Russian gas. Besides, TAP does not allow third-party accession for 25 years, 
so it has no room for Russian gas.361 Consequently, the only viable option for Russia is 
to carry its gas to Greece- Turkey border and deliver its gas to Bulgaria. With the 
construction of the interconnector between Bulgaria and Turkey, Trans-Balkan pipeline 
will be reversed, so that Russia will supply its gas to Southeast European countries via 
Turkey. These developments not only undermine energy security of Southeast European 








Turkey and the European Union have commonalities in the energy sector. Both of them 
have import dependency on Russia, and both of them try to diversify their energy mix 
and ensure the security of supply. These factors made Turkey and the EU natural strategic 
and inseparable partners in the field of energy. In the previous chapter, Turkey’s desire 
to become a physical energy hub and obstacles to become an energy hub such as price, 
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take or pay clause, capacity and availability of gas are analyzed. In the current context, it 
can be inferred that the possibility of Turkey to become energy hub is not viable. Other 
than a hub, Turkey can play an essential role for Europe as an energy transit country by 
transiting Azeri and Russian gas to the Union.  
As noted before, Azeri gas has a potential to break the Russian dominance in the 
Southeast European market in the situation that Azerbaijan supplies more gas to TANAP 
in the future. Southeast European countries are dependent on Russian gas, and they do 
not consume significant volumes of gas. In 2016, Gazprom exported 15,8 bcm of gas to 
five Southeast European countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia). 
These countries are dependent on gas imports more than 85%, and imports from Russia 
account for 75%. To be more elaborate, among the imports of the five Southeast European 
countries, Russian share in the gas imports of these countries in 2016 was Greece (66%), 
Bulgaria (100%), Hungary (66%), Slovakia (84%), Slovenia (56%), Croatia (73%) and 
Romania (100%).362 Among these countries, Croatia and Romania have domestic 
production. For this reason, they were not considered as dependent on Russian gas. In the 
same year, Croatia imported 40%, and Romania imported 10% of the gas that it 
consumed.363 
Figure 20: Natural Gas in Southeast Europe in 2016 (Bcm)364 
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There are considerable differences in energy infrastructure development levels between 
Western European and Southeast European countries. Compared to infrastructure in 
Western Europe, the infrastructure in Southeast Europe is weaker. Besides, the latter do 
not have LNG facilities except Greece and adequate gas storage capacities. Consequently, 
they are vulnerable to gas disruptions.365 To diversify Russian gas in the Union and to 
deal with high rate dependencies of Southeast European countries, Southern Gas Corridor 
was formulated. 
SGC is designed to improve the energy infrastructure of Central and Southeast Europe by 
bringing gas from Caucasus, Middle-East and Mediterranean regions.366 The main aims 
of SGC are to break Russian dependency with the diversification of gas routes and to 
secure European energy supply. The gas corridor is especially vital for Southeast 
European countries which are dependent on Russian gas. In the beginning, around 10 bcm 
of gas per year will be delivered to Europe with TANAP and TAP projects from 
Azerbaijan to Italy via Turkey. In the future, the EU aims to increase the capacity to 80-
100 bcm of gas per year.367 SCG has the potential to supply 20% of Europe’s gas needs.368 
TANAP and TAP will increase European supply security when the volumes of gas 
transported with these pipelines exceed the volumes provided by Russia in SGC.369 For 
this reason, SGC has a great potential to secure the energy supply of the EU.  
Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), was commenced in June 2018, will carry Azeri gas 
to Europe with 10 bcm capacity. The capacity of the pipeline can be increased with 
additional investments. In order to transport Azeri gas to the Southern countries of the 
Union, Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is developed. With this project, Azeri gas will reach 
to Greece and Italy. The Italian government has a desire to make Italy the energy hub for 
the Southeastern part of the Union, so TAP is strategically crucial for the Italian 
government.370 When Azeri gas reaches Italy, it will be distributed to the Western part of 
the Union so that the project will contribute to a gas connection between Southern and 
Northern parts of the Community.  
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The interconnector Greece-Bulgaria was designed to link Greek and Bulgarian 
infrastructures. With the interconnector, Bulgaria will be able to decrease its high 
dependency on Russian gas. The interconnector will be linked to TAP, so that Azeri gas 
will be flown to Bulgaria.371 The construction of the project is set to begin in 2018, and it 
is expected to finish in 2020. The initial capacity of the interconnector is 3 bcm, but it can 
be increased to 5 bcm with additional investments. The length of the project is 180km.372 
Also, thanks to LNG facilities of Greece, the interconnector can bring LNG to Bulgaria 
and Southeastern part of Europe. 
To decrease the vulnerability of Southeast European countries, the Eastring pipeline is 
designed. The pipeline will carry gas from Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and 
Slovakia. The pipeline can be connected to either the TANAP or Turkish Stream. If it is 
connected to TANAP, Azeri gas can decrease Southeast European countries import 
dependency on Russian gas significantly. The prospects of Azerbaijan to divert its gas to 
Southeast Europe is possible only if the country produces and supplies more gas to 
TANAP by developing its gas fields. Given the fact that these countries are almost 
entirely dependent on imports of gas, Azeri gas which will be transported via Turkey can 
play a decisive role by enabling these countries to switch to Azeri gas. Besides, it can 
contribute to the diversification efforts of the Union.  
Ionian Adriatic pipeline which will be constructed after 2019, will carry 5 bcm of gas to 
Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This pipeline will be 
connected to TAP. This means that Azeri gas will reach to Adriatic countries. As a result, 
Southeast European countries, as well as Adriatic countries, will be able to switch to Azeri 
gas. In order to increase the energy security of the Southeast European countries, the EU 
planned for the construction of interconnector between Croatia and Slovenia. The 
interconnector will be in service in 2019, and it will have 5 bcm capacity.373 With the 
completion of the interconnector, Azeri gas will reach to Slovenia. As noted above, 
Russian gas accounts for 56% of gas imports of Slovenia. Therefore, the interconnector 
and the IAP will increase the energy security of the country. 
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Figure 21: An Expanded Southern Gas Corridor374 
Perhaps 10 bcm of gas is a small amount for Western European countries, but it is vital 
for Southeast European and Adriatic countries since these countries do not consume 
excessive amounts of gas. Western European countries have developed gas infrastructure, 
LNG facilities and sufficient gas storage capacities, so they have alternatives to Russian 
gas, and they do not have energy security risks as in Southeast Europe.  
In Southeast Europe, existing interconnectors work only in one way. With the realization 
of the reversible interconnectors, Southeast European countries will be able to share Azeri 
gas and LNG with each other, and their gas infrastructures will be connected. Reverse 
flow is vital to ensure developing energy links and infrastructures between the member 
states, and it is vital for the energy security of the European Union. The eagerness of 
Russia to build Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream shows that Russia tries to increase its 
market share in the European Union. However, reverse flow between member states can 
consolidate energy security of the EU, especially Southeast European countries. 
 
                                                          







The future projections of IEA demonstrate that to meet its demand, imports of the 
European Union will increase up to 2040. Currently, Russia is the biggest supplier, and it 
is expected that Russia will keep its dominant position. To diversify Russian gas, the EU 
shifted its attention to LNG, renewable energy, and shale gas. Since Russia wants to keep 
its position in the European Union market, the developments in these sources urged 
Russia to lower its prices. Besides, Russian gas prices have decreased to oil-indexed 
natural gas prices. With lower prices, Russian gas became cheaper than LNG and shale 
gas of the U.S.  
As stated before, Russia wants to protect its market share in Europe to ensure revenues 
coming from energy sales, so it developed the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and Turkish Stream 
pipeline to reach its aim. However, the pipelines divided member states. Some countries 
are concerned about the pipelines such as Southeast European and Baltic countries while 
Western European countries are in favor of the pipelines. 
The primary motivation behind Russia’s decision to build Nord Stream 2 and Turkish 
Stream pipelines is to consolidate its market share in the European Union, so that the EU 
will continue to be dependent on Russian gas. However, TANAP will strengthen the 
energy security of the EU. 10 bcm of Azeri gas is not a significant volume for Western 
European countries but it makes difference in Southeast Europe since these countries 
consumed only around 35 bcm and imported around 23 bcm of gas in 2016. 
All in all, this chapter argues that besides Azeri gas which will be supplied to Europe in 
the short-run, LNG and renewables will make a significant contribution to the energy 
security of the Union in the medium to long-run. Moreover, the prospects of Azeri gas to 
consolidate energy security of Southeast European countries depends on Azerbaijan’s 
ability to increase gas production and its ability to supply more gas to Europe, so that 
some volumes can be diverted to Southeast Europe which will decrease import 










The energy plays a vital role for the daily services such as heating, transportation, and 
industry. Therefore, life without energy is unimaginable. Since the indigenous energy 
production of the European Union has been decreasing more than the fall in the energy 
consumption, the Community relies more on imports to satisfy its demand. This situation 
brings energy security to the forefront. Even though the EU imports oil, gas and coal from 
the abroad, the thesis focused on the issue pertaining to natural gas usage and trade. 
The issue of energy security became more visible after the two Ukrainian crises. The two 
crises affected the Southeast European countries significantly since they receive their gas 
over the Ukraine transit pipelines. After the two crises, the EU focused on consolidating 
the energy security of the Union. For example, the EU developed 2020, 2030 and 2050 
strategies and it increased its reliance on LNG. Other than these, the EU focused on 
diversification of supply routes. 
The thesis analyzed nine countries which can be alternative to Russian gas. These 
countries are Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Israel, and the 
Republic of Cyprus. After having elaborately explained the gas reserve capacities, 
internal and external factors, the thesis asserts that in short-run, Azerbaijan will be the 
alternative supplier via pipeline. In the medium to long-run, Iraq has a potential to supply 
gas to SGC. In fact, the prospects of Iraq to supply its gas to Turkey and then to Europe 
depends on the settlement of the disputes between KRG and Iraq. Besides, Iran, Egypt, 
and Israel are most likely to supply gas as LNG to Europe in medium to long-run. 
Consequently, gas competition in the European market will escalate which is vital for the 
energy security. Since Azerbaijan will supply its gas to Europe via Turkey, Turkey’s 
energy role in its region will increase. 
In the transfer of the energy, Turkey can be an energy transit country or an energy hub. 
The country targets to become an energy hub. By becoming a physical energy hub, 
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Turkey would define the terms and conditions for the transfer of energy to Europe, and it 
would facilitate trade between energy producing and consuming countries. However, in 
order for Turkey to become a physical energy hub, it needs to deal with four critical 
obstacles. These are the price of the gas in the long-term gas agreements, “take or pay” 
clauses, low natural gas storage capacity and availability of gas.  
The virtual hub is more convenient for Turkey to facilitate trade between the energy 
producing and consuming countries. However, Turkey has a desire to evolve into a 
physical energy hub than targeting to become a virtual hub. As long as the above-
mentioned obstacles remain, Turkey cannot go further than being an energy transit 
country. 
The IEA foresees that imports of the European Union will increase while at the same time 
exports of Russia will increase up to 2040. To decrease the share of Russian gas, the EU 
has increased its LNG imports. Even though the EU has a capacity of 210 bcm, it imported 
around 43 bcm of gas. The main reason why the EU imported a small amount of LNG 
while they had more capacity is due to the price of LNG and Russia’s ability to supply 
cheaper gas to the EU. Except for Greece, Southeast European countries do not have 
access to LNG. With the completion of LNG facilities in Croatia and an additional LNG 
facility in Greece, these countries will be able to import LNG. When these countries 
receive gas in the form of LNG, they can send it to other Southeastern European countries 
through reversible pipelines and interconnectors. Consequently, LNG will consolidate the 
energy security of the Union.  
Shale gas has a potential to increase the energy security of the Union. However, the price 
of the U.S. LNG will not be competitive compared to Russian pipeline gas prices. 
However, the most significant benefit of the U.S. LNG to Europe is that it has increased 
competition and has compelled Russia to lower its gas prices.375 
Renewables are the other sources that can strengthen the energy security. The share of 
renewables is expected to increase in the EU. However, these strategies are long-term 
targets, and it takes time. 
The EU and Russia have interdependence in the field of energy. The EU needs Russian 
gas to maintain its domestic consumption, and Russia needs revenues to feed its economy. 
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Therefore, the country tries to protect its share in the EU’s energy market to ensure 
revenues coming from these countries. With the developments in LNG and Shale Gas, 
Russia had to lower its gas prices. Before these developments, Russia had applied 
astonishing prices to European countries. 
To protect its domination and to punish Ukraine, Russia developed Nord Stream 2 and 
Turkish Stream pipelines. Since countries have different perceptions regarding Russian 
gas, the Union was divided regarding whether or not to obtain Russian gas. Russia aims 
to reverse Trans-Balkan pipeline, and it wants to connect Turkish Stream to that pipeline. 
Besides, the country is also eager to connect Turkish Stream to Eastering pipeline, so that 
Russian domination in Southeast Europe will prevail. The Eastring pipeline can be 
connected to either Turkish Stream or TANAP. If it is connected to TANAP, Azeri gas 
can play an important role in decreasing the import dependency of Southeast European 
countries on Russian gas significantly. The prospects of Azerbaijan to divert its gas to 
Southeast Europe is possible only if the country produces and supplies more gas to 
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